18 Burst results for "Liberal International"
Monocle 24: The Globalist
"liberal international" Discussed on Monocle 24: The Globalist
"Around the world. It's 7 25 a.m. here in London three 25 a.m. if you're a night owl in Rio de Janeiro, now Brazil's president Lula had suspended in Portugal next week. In the midst of one of the most delicate diplomatic balancing acts. In the last month alone, he's traveled to China to see Xi Jinping and his welcomed Russia's foreign minister Sergei Lavrov, both the U.S. and EU have seized upon Lula's choices of meeting partners, but will he be able to convince Europe that this is all part of a bigger diplomatic scheme. While I'm joined by Christopher sabatini, senior fellow for Latin America at chatham House. Good morning to Christopher. Good morning, Emma, thank you. It's good to have you. Now, what is the purpose of this Spain Portugal trip? Basically, Lula's trying to lure the president of Brazil is trying to rebalance his relations globally. He traveled to China, signed 20 agreements with Xi Jinping, the president of China, declared that he wanted to be a mediator in Russia and doing so kind of angered Western Europe and the U.S. who saw him as tilting a little bit too far to China and certainly a little too far to being neutral in the conflict in Ukraine with Russia's envy. An invasion of Ukraine. So you have a very difficult problem here is that now he has to sort of do another sweep and tour of Western Europe to try to bring them back in line and sway their fears that he's mediating in a way that may serve to sort of certify, if you will, and legitimize Putin's invasion of Ukraine. This is a bit of a headache for the European Union, isn't it, given the fact that arguably there was a welcome sigh of relief when he replaced Jai Bolsonaro as leader of Brazil, and yet he is now become a problem. That's exactly right. As you say, a huge sigh of relief, he replaced it at quasi fascist national populist elected president, who jettisoned the country's commitments to in the environment, raged against human rights and social inclusion. And so everyone thought, well, here comes returns to power Lula after two turns in power in the early aughts. And in truthfully, this is always been his vision is trying to create a multipolar world to try to break the control that Western Europe and the U.S. have had on the global order. But in doing so, he's inserting himself and if you will sort of risks allowing himself with malign actors. But it also undermines his own authority. Authority within Western Europe. Lula, Brazil rather is part of a southern cone, common market called medico Sue. And they have, they're waiting to have a free trade agreement ratified with the European Union. So his own sort of forays and being a global diplomat risk undermining his country's own economic interest. So there's a suggestion that his membership of mercosur and being able to have a conversation with Sergei Lavrov and Xi Jinping are exclusive. Not entirely. It's a good point. But you certainly, in the last year, Western Europe has invested a lot of energy, diplomatic and economic, no pun intended on the sanctioning of gas. In isolating Putin because of the invasion, and now here comes Lula, basically trying to, in some ways, he's walked back his statements, but for a long time he was saying that both sides Ukraine and Russia were equally to blame for the war. And this really sort of in fundamentally challenges one of the primary foreign policy objectives of Europe right now. So tell us a little bit about what Lula's ambitious are. You said you wants to place Brazil in a bigger strategic diplomatic role. But there is a sense that he wants to be the peace broker in the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. What are his chances? Again, this idea that Brazil is going to lead a sort of coalition of the global south and use platforms such as the BRICS alliance, the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa alliance to sort of break apart and create a new, if you will, world order, not to be too dramatic about this, is very much in Brazil's foreign policy DNA. And certainly in this party that's in power, Lula's part of the PT, it's foreign policy vision. Whether he can do it, it's unclear. The truth is, is Brazil really doesn't have many points of power to exercise on this. It's really sort of based on an idea and arguably even a rather facile idea that Brazil can bring a new agenda, a new voice, a new approach to foreign policy that the polarizing sort of west can't. But it's unclear. Again, doing so, sometimes means ignoring or at least downplaying the principles that have undergirded the liberal international order. In this case, basically overlooking or downplaying Putin's invasion of a country's national sovereignty. In another case, making alliances with autocrats such as China, Xi Jinping, who are trying to remake the global order in their own interests, not necessarily to create a sort of a benign multipolar order, but to remake it in their own national interests. And so it's going to be a tough play and risk maligning himself with aligning himself with some very maligned actors. And if you are one of these malign actors running things in the likes of Beijing and Moscow, how riper places Brazil for you. It's actually pretty important in a number of ways. For China, first of all, Brazil is a major supplier of a number of its raw materials, iron ore, a number of agricultural and food products, petroleum, but also symbolically it's important. Brazil's, it's a large country. It aspires to a UN Security Council seat. It really does seek to speak on behalf of developing countries worldwide. And so it is a very important. It wasn't just a mistake or a stopover that Lavrov went to Brazil. To put Brazil, I want to for Russia and China to claim the Brazil is at very least neutral if not a supporter of some of their issues. It's very important domestically for their own citizens, but also internationally to build this idea that in the case of China that China's time is coming and it's going to lead a new global coalition in the case of Russia that basically that the world is becoming tired and the momentum is shifting against the United States and Western Europe and it's sanctions against a Russian. So it is, in that case, in terms of symbolism and in terms of economics for some cases, it really does punch above its weight. And even briefly, if you don't mind, Chris, the idea that actually it can be a breeding ground for spies. If you're Russian, you can go to Brazil and claim yourself a new identity. Yeah, that's the new lingering scandal right now. Of course, a number of spies that have been uncovered are sort of disappeared and people connected the dots and realized their spies had Brazilian identity, although in the stories they weren't speaking Portuguese, which should have given it away. Yes, there is a risk that given Brazil's size. Immigration policies that it's being used as a sort of jumping off point for espionage by Russia. Christopher sabatini, thank you so much for joining us on Monaco radio still to come on today's global globalist and Christian Mac will be sitting down with sahi marchenko, Ukraine's finance minister. It really believes that it's our aim right now to protect democracy. And we believe that its Ukrainian destiny to do so. Oh, that's come in the next few minutes, but first of the time nudging 7 33 here in London, a quick look at the headlines. At least 70 people have been killed in a crush as a school in Yemen. Crowds have gathered for a charity distribution in the capital Sanaa authorities say the donation hadn't
Between The Lines
"liberal international" Discussed on Between The Lines
"That together and you end up with a very toxic mix of politics, even without throwing in social media Fox News and all that other stuff. I think those big forces are behind much of the dysfunction that you now see in the American political system. And unfortunately, nobody has a sort of quick, easy push the button and it's all solved type solution for it. My guest is Harvard professor Stephen Walt, one of America's leading foreign policy realists. Steve, let's turn to Ukraine. Now, you were at the Munich security conference recently and you found a mismatch between what government officials were saying in public and then what they were saying in private. First, tell us about the divide between the west and the rest with respect to Ukraine. This was really striking at Munich and there's actually some interesting public opinion data that's been produced that supports this. If you were a member of the transatlantic community, Europe or America, you know, Ukraine is the most important issue overwhelming focus there at the conference. It's seen as the fulcrum of the 21st century of the fate of humanity is going to be determined by the outcome in Ukraine. And absolutely the Ukrainians must win because everything is hinging upon this. That was kind of the rhetoric you heard from most people in the sort of NATO bubble, if you call it that. For the rest of the world, you know, again, to oversimplify the global south. And nobody was defending Putin or Russia, but Ukraine is not seen as the most important issue, not the only issue. Certainly not the one that's going to determine the 21st century. They just don't believe that the fate of humanity is going to be determined by whether Ukraine or Russia ultimately controls the Donbass. And there itself interest, right? India, Saudi Arabia, Israel, do not want to sever all their ties with Russia for a combination of economic and political reasons. The global south thinks that the west is being deeply hypocritical that, you know, they welcome Ukrainian refugees, but they wouldn't welcome refugees from Syria or from sub Saharan Africa or from Afghanistan as well. The west sort of dribbled out aid for COVID vaccines, but was willing to pour a $150 billion into Ukraine. So when people from the west from the transatlantic community start talking about how important Ukraine is and how everyone around the world has to get on board, the rest of the world shakes their head and says, you guys just don't get it, do you? I can just imagine many people asking for understandable reasons that with Russia's invasion of a sovereign independent state, surely the rules by liberal international order is at stake and all nations west all the rest have an interest in upholding those rules. People might agree with that intellectually, but the immediate response you get from outside the transatlantic bubble is that this is rank hypocrisy. But first of all, these rules of the rules based order were written by powerful Western countries for the most part, not by India and not by states in Africa elsewhere.
Bloomberg Radio New York
"liberal international" Discussed on Bloomberg Radio New York
"The latest sound on podcasts, professor Charles kuchen from the council on foreign relations on whether China will help bail out Russia in Ukraine. The fact that the Chinese went to Moscow during this week suggests that they're not uncomfortable being on the side of the aggressor in this war. And over time, they have not shown a lot of discomfort. I think beneath the surface, the Chinese are not loving this war because it creates geopolitical and geo economic stability and China has risen on the backs of both. They don't like it when we see decoupling when there's a great deal of uncertainty in the markets. That having been said, they're not unhappy to see the U.S. we distracted in Europe. They're not unhappy to see the Russians leave the charge against an American led liberal international system. Do I think we're about to see the Chinese transfer lethal weapons? No. What I think is going on here is that the Biden people picked up some chatter and as they've done since well before the war began, they are getting out ahead. They're disclosing intelligence to try to stay ahead of the curve. We're trying to give money that Russia could use to buy weapons. Well, they, in some ways, they are giving money. Oil and gas. And they're also trading more. Whether they actually start violating various kinds of sanctions, we don't know. I'm guessing the Chinese right now are feeling
Between The Lines
"liberal international" Discussed on Between The Lines
"Student of China since he was 18 years old as an a and new undergraduate, Kevin riders lived for a number of years in the U.S. where he's the chief executive of the Asia society in New York. His new book is called the avoidable war. The dangers of a catastrophic conflict between the U.S. and Xi Jinping's China. That's published by has shed Australia. Kevin Rudd, welcome back to the program. Good to be with you, Tom. Now you say China is retreating from wolf warrior diplomacy, yet it's still advances its strategy for dominance. Tell us more. Well, what's the difference classically in the Chinese understanding? Between tactics and strategy, China's strategic ambition, which is to become the dominant power in East Asia and the west Pacific and to become the dominant global strategic and economic power. Remains in place. But I think there is an analysis in Beijing, the tactically, the flurry of wolf warrior diplomacy, and episodic thuggery, which accompanied it, has not necessarily in the tradition of Dale Carnegie being the best things for winning friends and influencing people. In fact, it's gone in the reverse direction. So I noticed the wolf warriors in recent times have been rained back in again. It doesn't mean that operationally Chinese diplomacy or foreign policy or national security policy is going to be on the defensive. But simply that the public tonality of it for the period ahead may well change and soften. Does all this mean then that Australia and the west have been incredibly naive in engaging with China during the last three decades. Now, before you answer that, let's hear from your old sparring partner on this program, Kevin. This is professor John Misha from the University of Chicago on the folly of western engagement in the post Cold War era. What engagement says is that if we can integrate China into the international economy that the United States helped create during the Cold War. We can integrate it into that economy, integrate it into institutions like the World Trade Organization. It will be calm, a very powerful country, but it will become a peaceful country and a so called responsible stakeholder in the international system. Now, for a realist like me, this was a crazy policy. This was remarkably foolish because what you were going to do in my story was you were going to create a very powerful China that was then going to try to dominate Asia, push the United States out of Asia and develop power projection capability that could be used outside of Asia to change America's dominant position in the world, engagement was a major mistake. As professor John me Sharma on between the lines last December, Kevin Rudd, you've been a strong advocate of China engagement, but in more recent times you've described yourself as either a brutal realist or a hopeful realist, do you now recognize that we in the west, as John may sharman just put it, we've just been feeding the beast. Well, miss schemers analysis is firstly a historic and B deceptive. Let me go to those points in sequence. A historic in the sense that engagement has been pursued by the United States with multiple countries in the past, not least of which has been post war Japan and post war Germany. They were invited to join the table of the liberal international order. They became powerful, but they chose to remain within the order. Now, a similar approach was adopted, of course, a generation after that, or two generations after that, in terms of post 78, U.S. engagement with China and particularly post 2002 engagement with China when China was admitted to the World Trade Organization. And the results, of course, as we see with China's carrot assertiveness and determination to establish an alternative to the real international order, has not been successful. But the second point is this, this is where he's been misrepresenting what the United States, I believe, was doing over that period of time. The argument often used by those on the far right, of which I associate with which I associate mere shime is this. Is that the United States under successive American presidents from bush through back through Clinton or from bush one through Clinton through bush two and then Obama, et cetera. Had been engaged in engagement unqualified until we had the Moses on Mount Sinai moment of Trump and national security adviser for the Trump administration, HR McMaster, producing the new national security strategy of late 2017. It's an inconvenient truth that engagement was never unqualified. It was engagement plus hedge and remember hedge equaled contained to have the military capability to act in the eventuality that engagement failed. That's within that framework. That's why, for example, Obama administration engaged in the pivot to Asia militarily and embrace the trans Pacific partnership in order to hedge against any emergence of Chinese assertiveness and or regression. So that's been conveniently left off the mere charming recollection of history. I'd have to say having known me and Sharma will for 20 years, he's not on the far right. He's a pretty mainstream intellectual. He's just a hardcore realist when it comes to foreign policy, but leaving that aside. How many of these have you seen on the far left recently? Well, I think he's in the middle, but nevertheless, well heavily bull was a realist. As you know, heavily bull from a new, one of the great Australian realists and he was a man of the left, but leaving that Assad, you acknowledge that China wishes to become the dominant economy in the political system in the strategic power, not just in the Asia Pacific, but globally over time. That's what you're saying in your book, but this process, let me submit this to you. Let's not just take in a few years. That's been happening over decades, hasn't it, so I'll ask again, why are you and so many former western leaders so late in recognizing the China threat? I think the other thing I would add to what you just said before is that headley ball was also the father of the English school of international relations, which was not the American school of realism. The English school of international relations had two traditions within it. One a realist analysis of the balance of power, but secondly, the construction of a system of international institutions, which could militate against the possibility of rolling crisis conflict and war. So therefore, I respond to your last point because I think it needs to be corrected. In terms of your general assertion that there has been a level of strategic naivety about engage and hedge, which is the accurate description of U.S. strategy over a long period of time and that of its allies. You may recall that back in 2009, as prime minister of Australia, I presided over a defense white paper which was produced which said, we need to be vigilant about the emergence of a more assertive China militarily in our region. It formed the strategic basis for the Australian defense white paper of 2009, which commissioned two things, a doubling of the submarine fleet, and an increase in the surface fleet by a third, our Chinese friends went nuts when we produced that, because they thought it was far too overt and direct in describing what China operationally had already begun to do during the second term of the Hu Jintao administration. So that's my response.
podcast – Lawyers, Guns & Money
"liberal international" Discussed on podcast – Lawyers, Guns & Money
"Always bought was kind of at the core of what i'm trying to do. Wilson in many ways was conceiving of the liberal international project at a moment when liberal democracies seemed to be on the move every country west russia. After in one. Thousand nine hundred. Ninety was some kind of parliamentary system. there was a sense that in his own mind but also others around him and cross european in north america. A a space since liberal democracy was on the march and so in some sense what wilson was doing was leveraging matt that that movement of liberal democracy to to try to build a better international order so in some sense a liberal democracy was the glue that was going to hold the international order together whereas in roosevelt's time everything the rehearsing that liberal democracy is is experiencing a maybe even an extension moment. It looks like it's not working other models other dirty projects are in the offi. Germany was in various quarters in the united states and elsewhere at least into the middle thirties was seen as providing some kind of answers to the problem. The great depression around and the kind of of industrial society at that moma a so there was a sense of liberal. Democracy is really On the roads and that the international order that we need to build will provide this. Why it's the reverse wilson vision international order that is neat glue that will hold liberal democracies together so this is an important reason why returning to the roosevelt had conception is so important because it really gets us to this view that construction that ecosystem of of states that are working degree a a kind of higher level set of institutions and responsibilities and capacities and thorny relationships so that these joel and vulnerable and conflicted and today polarized liberal democracies and can a liquor wounds and rebuild their institutions kind of so. It's very much roosevelt. You'd think of biden you the reconstruct. It infrastructure infrastructure. Bill is something but it's also a metaphor for ability back the infrastructure of liberal democracy. And the send us of of a working. International order problem solving pragmatic roosevelt. Was as keynes wrote in what was a wonderful little piece published a letter in the new york times In the late birdies basically grazing roosevelt or for his a pragmatism and effort to kind of willingness to re imagine liberal democracy and industrial society or these much more difficult times but it was very much a pragmatic roosevelt was not sees particular vision. It was more you know. We're entering eight a period where we don't quite know what all the moving parts are so we're going to kind of move here see if this works in a does will keep moving. Not real will turn around. We'll try something else so kind of casting exercise in problem solving and learning that you see throughout this period that that seems to be they. That's that's the liberal internationalism that that i think is what those who want to keep keep it to redeploy who want to see that it has another cycle that kind of world.
podcast – Lawyers, Guns & Money
"liberal international" Discussed on podcast – Lawyers, Guns & Money
"Dan nexen. Today i'm talking to john. I can bury about all things liberal international order. John i can vary the alberti millbank professor of politics and international affairs at princeton university in the department of politics and the princeton school of public and international affairs. He's also the co director of princeton's center for international security studies. John is a whole list of other accolades which you can go read about on his website. He is the author of eight books including after victory institutions strategic restraint in the rebuilding of order after major wars which came out with princeton's who thousand one liberal leviathan the origins crisis and transformation of the american system which came out in two thousand and eleven and most recently a world safe for democracy liberal internationalism the crisis of global order which was published by yale university. Press in twenty twenty. We're gonna primarily talking about arguments that john makes the world safe for democracy as well as some pieces that you may have read me talking about at the blog most notably his piece on roosevelt and foreign policy with dan duty which appeared this year in foreign policy. And i want to start by welcoming john to our program. Thank you dan. It's great to be here so there's a lot we can talk about. I think that the i wear. I really would like to start though is if you could tell our listeners about your most recent book which i think is a really important backdrop or all the different contexts that they've been reading your name risk. Yes absolutely the the book that tha you're speaking of That came out last fall. A world safe for democracy which really is my effort to to reconstruct and eliminate the liberal international traditional across the two hundred two hundred years and it really begins with the debate that everyone is having kind of crisis of the contemporary. Bobo order the breakdown of the.
The Lawfare Podcast
"liberal international" Discussed on The Lawfare Podcast
"Maybe he's gonna win points on that but for the most part. You're not impressed with this guy hockey moral for a if we again we really. It's much too early to know. But i think he got china's attention and He a in. We'll have to see how that plays out the so called. Phase one trade agreement is is not much is. We don't know whether it's going to get to the heart of the of the issues of so. I'd given that i also we give him on. I think i rated reasonably on the use of force which is that there has been a degree of proportion discrimination and his limited attacks on syrian chemical causes. Was i think what about the level of obama should have done but you can plead the chapter before this omanis. Somali strike came afterwards. And i think that's a case where for reasons. I mentioned earlier. He lost his sense portion. Right so my last question is about donald trump administration. There was a giant spurt of writing about the roles based international order. There were people who said it's over with that. Trump represents the end of the rules-based international order. There are people who defended it. You gave a qualified defense. I think it's fair to say the rules based interactive order wondering. I have no idea of out how much of this book was. A response to trump. Who and a response to this this conception that were this idea that the rules based international order is either defunct or not worth defending. It was this while he brought high impart but the book actually has roots. Go back much deeper. i'd never heard with donald trump but not in the political sent When i was thinking about this. I think there is a lot of talk about the end of the liberal international order. What i say. The book was dropped. The word liberal difference between liberal international order which is will sewn in which tries democracy and we ought to realize it when you have a great power like china they don't wanna be liberal and there's not much you about that in the short run at least but rules-based there still is a a role and going back to that point bad axe rodney's to shins and the long shadow future chinese have an interesting certain rules based dimensions and climate is probably the most dramatic was so i think we don't wanna as we get rid of the losers about the liberal international order. That's not the same rules-based international order which you begin to get cooperation in the production of public goods. That i is whatever is trying to make a distinction. That's great joe. Thank you very much. This book is an excellent book on many levels. It's like a lot of great books. It is both accessible to the general reader. But it's also theoretically very sophisticated. Both i think it's fair to say that both novices and experts Thank you. I tried to write for real people. The law fair. Podcast is produced in cooperation with the brookings institution. Thanks this week to joseph nye for coming on the show. If you have a second please. Share the l'affaire podcast on social media. And give us a five star rating and review. Wherever you found us you can also purchase fair swag at our online store. Www dot the law. Fair store dot com..
The President's Inbox
"liberal international" Discussed on The President's Inbox
"That we face in the world one last general question name if we talk about specific issues and that is has there been anything about the biden foreign policy. That has surprised you that you didn't expect seven months ago. If there's one thing that surprised me. I think it's the ripples of tension in the transatlantic relationship how well the transatlantic relationship is sort of taken place on two tracks and the first being of course financing america's back and and being willing to meet with the president of the european union talking g seven partners and i think if you take a look at sort of rhetorical level. There's a lot of of bonomi. I guess you know in the sense of they are happy to be dealing with. Joe biden as opposed to donald trump and to be fair mission has taken steps that i don't think trump would have done for example announcing that the us would not sanction germany over and and russia over nord stream. Two would certainly would be a very prominent example. This is the pipeline bring gas from russia directly to germany bypassing each european countries that to some extent depend upon dues a royalties. They collect from allowing the transit right. And this of course. There's concerns that. This puts eastern european countries at a disadvantage of russia and also potentially gives russia leverage over germany in addition. So that's the the sort of you know on the surface. I think deeper down. I think the by administration has been somewhat surprised at how much european officials actually still embrace neoliberalism as we talk about it. In terms of sort of an open forum globalization because that is not necessarily what the biden foreign economic policy team believes. And so. this doesn't necessarily mean. There's there's going to be inevitable clash but i do think that some of the biden officials were surprised by the pushback. They've been getting from some of the european officials widely surprise game. Because i have heard about the biden team as they experienced veteran diplomats. Many of them who speak the languages of europe spent a lot of time in europe. So how can you be that now. They're suddenly surprised at the europeans. Actually kinda like globalization and neoliberal approaches because the foreign economic policy team while being very smart and having some background aren't necessarily europe experts are not necessarily diplomats and it's easy to look at europe and owner. They want a more managed form of capitalism. And it's not exactly the way europe fix about this. Which is they they believe in this sort of liberal international order and if you believe in the economic dimension of the liberal international order and so there are issues that the bite administration wants to policies that the biden wants to execute on things like industrial policy or government procurement. Or what have you. That are fundamentally at odds with the europeans. Think about this and so you could argue that paradoxically. The administration is suffering from the problem. That previous us administrations have actually succeeded in erecting. An order that the europeans bought into and the europeans are still believers in that..
Chapo Trap House
"liberal international" Discussed on Chapo Trap House
"Excellence of of what humanity should try to be in and we have to Uphold that image at all times and trump was. You know doesn't clearly. I mean to the extent united actually upholds at image which would question. Donald trump is clearly not it. Yeah he He openly disavowed. American exceptionalism mental. Pull people noticed actually on the campaign trail but He said he didn't like the term and he consistently presented the united states as in a competitive environment in the world where the united states had no special moral claim To stand over the world. Now he continued to want the united states to dominate others. So i don't think kids rejection of exceptionalism lead to a better place at all but nevertheless did not go for this traditional view of the indispensable nation. And i think that drove people wild and that's the big quote were related to that. I'm gonna mangle it a little bit but you know the we're killers to putin's a killer a lot of killers get a lotta killers. While you think our country so innocent and liberal media stanford they went apoplectic over that. Because basically i think the trump administration in general is just he literally an every element of his policy. made subtext in his in his in his speeches and in his literal. You know justifications for what the actual effects of these things were just used to justify them in a way that no one had ever done before But you know thank god Biden was elected. We could all be this. I of relief we could. We could return to brunch as a famous saying goes. so why. don't we actually turn to our reading series. And i'll turn it over to my co host derek davidson to expound upon this wonderful essay that appeared in foreign policy magazine Last week yet. No it's a classic and just to give some brief context decec- was written by daniel dugny and our door ni And john i can berry. Who are basically and steven. You correct me if i'm wrong. Sort of the dawn of the of what might be termed a liberal approach to international relations essentially argues that multilateral capitalism multilateral exchange through essentially western dominated north north atlantic dominated international institutions are the key pieces or anything to add to that. I can berries at princeton endured. Needs somewhere also really good. I forget world. Look it up but Stephen is at an accurate portrayal of what he's at hopkins donate. Is that an accurate portrayal. Yeah i can vary also wrote a book that came out recently and you can see that. He is tried to fit the history and the biden administration into the framework of that book as a lot of scholars. Do but that's part of the problem with this piece. So okay this. This piece is the intellectual foundations of the biden revolution. That's sure spend six months. But and he has really done anything. Revolutionary but seventeen nineteen point nine. Five two thousand twenty one. I don't necessarily want you guys to comment on this first paragraph. But i do want to read it because i think for people who haven't seen the article it will Draw picture The unexpected four years of the donald trump presidency took us foreign and domestic policies and troubling directions frontally rejecting pillars of what he took to the biparti partisan establishments foreign policy trump set the united states on a boldly different path. He rejected long standing alliance commitments. Calling into question. Nato and the security pacts with japan and south korea he attacked star international institutions withdrew the united states from numerous arms control and free trade agreements. Even going so far as pulling out of the world health organization in the middle of pandemic. He embraced climate nihilism and withdrew from the paris climate accord. He was hostile to the promotion of democracy and human rights. He aggressively alienated allies. While cozying up to a rogues gallery of despots autocrats and populists. God imagine. And i i just want to underline very quickly the sort of democracy promotion stuff like obviously we all know. It's bullshit with regards to iraq but in terms of history this political scientists lindsey or rock in. Her book has revealed that the us tried to covertly overthrow regimes. Sixty six times. And i believe in forty. Four of those cases explicitly supported authoritarian or anti-democratic forces. So that's the type of democracy promotion that we're referring to here. So this is i mean this paragraph gotta make clear what we're talking about is is donald. Trump is a fundamentally different kind of president who broke american foreign policy. Although you know here we are six months into the by administration. Seems like we've pretty much either continued deliberately or fixed all this trump trump. Did you know kind of reverse them. but you know they. They go on to sort of lament the fact that There's no roosevelt deion school of foreign policy. You know there's there's schools for named after alexander. hamilton and thomas jefferson andrew jackson. John quincy adams. John quincy adams. And then there's a bunch of 'isms of course you got you have neo. Conservatism realism isolationism liberal international's etc which seems indistinguishable from what these guys are talking about. But okay but there's no rooseveltism and this is this is bad and i guess so my first question to the two of you is What is roosevelt. And i think we should start with what they kind of lay out here. You know we go into the peace and they right. At one point that roosevelt is a colossus in us history is a truism over the course of his unprecedented twelve years in office he accomplished a revolutionary recasting of the united states domestic order and place in the world and then you know sort of goes through his record internationally. The united states went from being a regional power to a global military superpower leader of a multi continental wartime alliance more than anyone else roosevelt laid the foundations for pax americana and inaugurated what became known as the inter american century. Here's the key part. The roosevelt's revolution was decisive in development of modern liberalism but it builds on it's an international but it built on its predecessors such as theodore roosevelt's new nationalism and wilson's new freedom and was in turn built upon by successors including hairiest truman's fair deal. John f can new frontier and linden. Johnson's great society. It was this this political project which biden has returned that brought the united states to its peak of greatness. So i'm as i'm trying to figure out what. Sdr rooseveltism is This is the first statement of it and it sounded. The the the first thing i thought of was You know when they asked the now dearly departed donald rumsfeld where the wmd were and he said well..
Chapo Trap House
"liberal international" Discussed on Chapo Trap House
"Is what just annoys me so much about the i can bury peace politics. I'm getting the pronunciation that naming correct but it's just like so focused on where the empire was good. I have to say if you're in france if you're in the uk if you're in the f. r. g. west germany. It's a pretty good thing be under you know in the us. imperial sphere. And i think you know if you're looking back on this history and fifteen hundred years you might even effectively say from germany to the west. There's a north atlantic polity that is developing over time. And you can view the world wars as a type of civil war in but that's for another time but it totally rights out. The the other things that are happening particularly in the philippines for the united states fought a brutal counterinsurgency campaign that was defined by horrible racism. You know the water cure. I e waterboarding and things that would become foundational. The american experience but stephen shaqs. How dare you. Don't you know that trump has destroyed the liberal international order and that everything that we have done for for the world has been taken apart So what do you think. How do you think trump fits into this larger story that you're telling because would he was elected. This was the big fear right. The united the abandonment of the liberal international order of foreign affairs foreign policy. All of these places were publishing these pieces about how trump was his big shifts. So what do you think. I wanna ask i. What do you think that reaction which two i know that both of To all three of us seemed overblown at the time. What do you think that was a reflection of fear. So i still don't know what the liberal international order is the fact that phrase rules-based international order now so it's even see even more rules based us lead rules based liberal international artists. Keep on adding adjectives to distress postwar rules-based liberal international order. That's all the adjectives. Yeah that's all you can pick and choose from those very few people. Were actually talking about that thing. Before trump right so this tradition is brought into being at least in those terms right suddenly in reaction to trump. My reading of it is that well i in the campaign. A lot of people wanted to exclude trump Just knock them out by saying he's an isolationist and then when he used the phrase america first and he made noises about wars in the middle east and he questioned alliances all seemed to be falling into place. Can't questioned alliances. That's number one rule to question alliance is to be beyond the pale. It is the most knowing even question it is and then we can talk about your nato peace but it's so ridiculous. Sorry stephen their sacred. No i mean i just needs a rebrand nato and if you just call it by oton like that will get people off attachment she nato they love it they love it folks so so i there is this attempt to just say look. Trump is beyond the pale but didn't work if anything. It seemed to confirm to certain voters that trump was indeed as different from the status quo as he claimed to be which he wasn't and then it became a line of attack us to basically equate. us lead multi-lateralism with us military primacy as if those things go together naturally. Could you expand on that a bit. What do you what. What's us lead multi-lateralism. What are you referring to. So you know when trump does Things like pull out of the w. h. o. One of his earlier ones was to pull out at unesco et cetera. Which the has done before. I i might add the. Us has pulled out of the unesco before yeah same reason correct Many of the things trump did our foreign policy have precedents that are not even far in the past Even his rhetoric about alliances like obama was saying similar things much more politely to ask europeans to spend more on their defense so was His secretary of defense robert gates and then it was. How dare trump say these things in a nasty wet and then wind up in exactly the same place on policy right The nato alliance continues and expands under his watch alliances. Us alliances expanded under the trump administration. And not a single war was ended. Let's just be clear about that fact. But the argument was made Specifically he's out to destroy this. Us led rules-based postwar liberal international order and therefore is the antithesis of everything. America's been trying to do since well the date kind of varied but nineteen forty five or nineteen forty eight. Or whenever you said. This order came into being. And you know. I i see this as another attempt to try to rehabilitate. Us military dominance and make. It seem like it's one of the same Essential to Other forms of international cooperation. And that's what the concept of isolationism. That's what it's usage does because against isolationism you can seem to want to dominate the world and cooperate with everyone else at the same time so a question that i have and both of you guys is what is sort of the the I'm trying to think of the right word like there's almost it's like with the dowager countess is offended when you eve. It's like how dare you. There's sort of a cultural elements to To people's responses. Would you make this arguing about us foreign policy which is almost very fragile and very unbelieving. And i was wondering as you too much more than me have been in sort of the blob world is what is the relationship between these people's identities and us foreign policy that they get so offended. How dare you you know how dare you suggest that france pay for it security. It's such a strange cultural elements me. I was wondering what you guys thought about that. Either you and they didn't. They didn't complain about asking france to pay for it security when the obama administration asked you know. It's really about. I think this investment and america's image american prestige as the leader of this rules based international whatever international order And trump Was was too much of a buffoon to kind of Play the role that the image of an an american president is kind of You know grandee of this system And you know he was just a lot schreuder about it. And that's i think embarrassing on some level to people in the the foreign policy that because these aren't necessarily things that they don't believe themselves a lot of the things that trump would talk about. These aren't things that you know. Are things You know you talk about sort of in over a glass of whiskey or something at the bar. But they're not things that you're supposed to say in public out loud And it just like you know. Get that back behind the curtain here. Yeah i think that's right. And i think there's a lot of american foreign policy to bait is really about american identity. America's leadership role in the world is Part of how the country understands what it is. So when hillary clinton could talk about america's already great in the twenty sixteen campaign that goes together with the idea idea that we stand tall in the world. We're the indispensable farther yes. This is the madeleine albright quote. It's really wacky. She said she basically says in one thousand nine hundred eight interview with. I believe matt lauer that america stands taller and sees farther so of people die. It was worth it. Essentially those factor reagan's china's sitting on the hill rhetoric. I mean it's the same. It's just different versions of the same thing. America is the example par..
Fully Automated
"liberal international" Discussed on Fully Automated
"The belief at all but there is no real conflicts that it's all just kind of misunderstanding of different forms or a clash of identities and identities as we all know can be kind of socially constructed remolded and this is what i knew kind of theoretical framework. Tell us and therefore ultimately there is no political cone. I was amazed by by seeing all of this car that it spoke directly to our own times. But then we'd worse in fact that we'd recreated the same problems which card soju ever come with recreated them in different forms not perhaps in of the league of nations international law but in ideas of constructivism and the european union. And so on which i guess will come onto. The i think other say is about the difference. I suppose it's i think that our pattern of politics today kind of proves car in reverse so cars model is about liberal. Kind of international politics found on mass politics on the integration of urban working class voters the extension of the franchise mass nationalism nationalist politics the expansion of large and powerful states based on these nations kind of struggling to assert their interests against others And all of that seems to me. He says liberal internationalism could survive in that context and it seems to me the reason that we have liberal internationalism today is precisely because that context is gone so that mass politics has been surpressed deem is kind of defused in various ways through supranational politics And so this is the way in which international politics has been recreated in the aftermath of the cold war. I think that he is by the suppression of mass politics. So the claiming the book is that car is proved in reverse as as if you want because mass politics broad liberal international politics low in the interval period has been suppressed over the last eight years and this is why liberal international politics liberal international order. If that's possible if it's legitimate talk. In those terms patrick's criticism though was standing devised by virtue of the suppression of politics..
Fully Automated
"liberal international" Discussed on Fully Automated
"It's a tough one. Because i would like to think myself no kind of no not to be any kind of starry eyed believer in liberal international order but it and indeed liberal transformation is something which is frequently been disastrous over the last twenty years of what i style is the new twenty crisis but it seems to me to perhaps erm jerry into the game and advanced to say that there is no possibility of liberalism in an anarchist political system to me. I suppose you could say. There is deep complicity between anarchic systems and lisbon as as the ultimate anneke that is clay is the anarchy of the market system and that there is the anneke that kind of underpins the anneke of the state system that is laid on top of it but beyond that. I think that it's we can. I think it's legitimate to talk about liberal national order not perhaps in terms in which it understands itself but in terms of the way in which kinds of politics is justified in the institutions. They understand themselves which they legitimate themselves. The way in which they cast their appeal and even though those institutions and ideas and frameworks is kind of meet their limits. Very quickly to simply say that. It's simply say that it doesn't exist by virtue of the fact that it's always kind of hypocritical and bloody and that ordering is always a difficult process and that it's always tortured and falls short desperation. I'm not sure that. I i'm not sure it's sufficient though. Obviously i partake in the same kind of critique the that pad levels at the the international the idea of liberal international. We might be able to find. So perhaps jack so good three saint. I think a. That's not about place for me to maybe hop in there..
And Now The Hard Part
"liberal international" Discussed on And Now The Hard Part
"Wist would like the built in road to turn. The eurasian landmass into a zone with influence with china's interests are attended to. I think finally with china which is to be militarily is to have by decade's end the modernization of its military completed and to cause american military planners to conclude that within these station theater it would be too expensive for the united states to contemplate any open military action against the people's liberation army navy or air force. You know what you're describing seem so well thought through and not really aggressive and at least not in the sense that summoned the west and even in parts of asia tend to see and it's easy to forget that technically china hasn't gone to war since what nineteen seventy-nine it hasn't funded armed insurgents anywhere in the world since the early nineteen eighties. You can't say that about any other member of the un security council. China in its deep strategic. Culture does not have a big interest in. Let's call it formal. Colonial expansion along the lines of the european colonial powers from the sixteenth seventeenth eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. That's i think. The first point. I think the second is with china aspires to have in. The world is creating zones of economic influence of foreign policy influence to the point that china's coal national interest in values on no longer challenged by other individuals states or global institutions like the united nations human rights council for example geneva so for those who have a different will view in terms of the centrality. Although it's coal ups the liberal international rules based order incrementally put together by the united states since nine forty four. Forty five if you're an architect that order or code to that order then you will find a china challenge confronting indeed but that's different from as it were in your face military confrontation outside china's immediate peripheral areas at want to ask you about the elephant in the room and that's now former. Us president donald trump. What in your opinion did his. Very bald zero-sum approach to china due to this relationship. My own view is that the chinese would probably have preferred to see trump's reelection as a reason for that is because trump was such a giant wrecking bowl at work. Around the world. In eroding and corroding the pillars of american power in the world becoming for example the champion of global protectionism china to rape our country. And that's what they're doing. It's the president trump escalating his trade war just moments ago taking new aggressive action against china. The president furious at beijing for today imposing tariffs on seventy five billion dollars of american goods. And this evening. He fired right back with another tariff hike of his own. He owns america's longstanding history. All the support for free trade on top of that. A failure to embrace critical regional free trade agreements the trans-pacific partnership promised during his.
Right Now with Stephen Kent
"liberal international" Discussed on Right Now with Stephen Kent
"Know being much more on on the order side of the spectrum of order and liberty that the conservative movement is always Jostling at different equilibrium points on and It's sort of led to me being very activated around the time of the two thousand sixteen election to support the more populous nationals agenda that president trump ran and won in those years. You don't like to use the populist word right. No i'm not the biggest fan of it. Why because. I think that there are a it comes down to what i think. The responsibility of leaders should be the responsibility of leaders. Should be to be good to be patriotic to noble elites that that look for the best for the people And that's sometimes as popular. Sometimes it's not right. I mean is it. Is it populist. Circa two thousand fifteen for president trump to run on a trade protection platform when the the broad populist. The republican party yet support that right leadership is built in to governing and leading people On policy issues that matter on that are in their best interest is part and parcel of that you don't get from eighty percent You know supporting free trade in the republican party to eighty percent not supporting free trade in the republican party on populism alone you get it on advocating for an agenda that is in their interest in the national interest. I think that's part of the area. Where i get a little confused with sort of your factions view of responsibility to the people that there is a duty of the elite. The people here in washington to do what is best for the people but also not always follow public opinion right off the cliff right like if the people don't know what is in their best interest or if the people believe that steel tariffs will actually be good for them but it ends up resulting in seventy five to one hundred and seventy five thousand jobs being lost and more steel mills being closed. I would think that it is then. The responsibility of the populist nationalist should be like i know you think foreign imports or the problem here but we are not going to levy tariffs you kind of get where i'm coming from on that. Think entirely fair if it's an evidence but it's not necessarily right and i think that they're sort of a tripartite set of issues that i think. Distinguished president trump when he first ran in twenty fifteen from the rest of the field Foreign policy ending endless wars Immigration and trade and maybe more broadly considered economic nationalism. Right Each of those issues had a consensus opinion in sort of liberal international circles that was at varying degrees proven wrong You know the idea that you would see low. Low end wage increases for the first time a half century Because of the policies of of of a restrictive trade of restrictive immigration regime would have been contra everything that was coming out of the elite circles. It's always a balancing act right. that's why it can't be the rule that whatever is popular is good. Whatever is good as popular but I i think it does involve looking beyond the very narrow consensus on what is even political question. To begin with that exists in washington. Dc yeah kind. One of those. Those intersections crossroads where public opinion. Maybe what is good for people and then what is right..
Serve to Lead | James Strock
"liberal international" Discussed on Serve to Lead | James Strock
"There were both presidents of the american historical association. Now i could look at recent presidents irrespective of party. I couldn't imagine them following a meeting of the american historical association almost much less being president. What do you think about that. Well sometimes i confess. I have trouble following some meetings in the american historical association. But i very much take your point you know. There is a common invocation of history. It american foreign policy. It's just superficial. There's been a lot of discussion in the past five. Ten years about the so-called postwar. Us lead rules-based rules-based liberal international order almost entirely aim to say how terrible it was that donald trump supposedly stood against it. When really hardly anyone could define what this was and then if you would read descriptions of this supposed order it would include institutions like the eu created in the nineteen nineties in that order You know nato is created after the un is that just a million problems one. What has with it so Bef- we don't just need more history. That would be nice but we need to have a real openness to the richness that history properly understood can provide us. It should be mind opening and often makes doesn't have easy lessons not the simplistic lessons That suddenly become the talking points of of of of the day and even words contested the very contesting of that can be valuable and we just simply for the moment seemed to be turning our back on it. Let's enclosing stephen worth. You obviously have so much to think about your written a brilliant and beautiful new book and by the way it's very attractively designed as well as written so beautifully. Is there anything. You'd like to leave our listeners. With today why hope your listeners judge the book by its cover so go look it up tomorrow. The world the birth of us global supremacy My words don't do justice to the beautiful cover. You're absolutely right. And i had nothing to do with that cover but More seriously i hope that Listeners will find it to be Enjoyable read and one that is illuminating. Whatever they make of it. I think it's possible to read this book. I made a lot of discoveries in in archives. It's i think it's probably impossible to to read the book and not learn something you hadn't done before and I think it's possible to read the book and come to the conclusion well maybe. Us leadership military leadership was Important and necessary thing. But i hope you'll think about why that was if that was the In its original moment in the middle of the twentieth century and whether going forward.
KQED Radio
"liberal international" Discussed on KQED Radio
"Looks like a better decision down the road than it does today? I think there could I mean, remember, Brexit is really about the idea of national sovereignty. It's not about economics. And this is how Boris Johnson put it on Christmas Eve. When he finally got that trade deal, The British people voted to take back control of their money, their borders, their laws. And, of course, that's in an economic cost, Ari. Another potential scenario where Brexit looks a little better. Is it politically? The U becomes even harder to manage. And the U. K in the end is glad that I got out when it did. That's NPR's Frank Langfitt. Thank you for all of your coverage of the story over the years, and particularly today on this historic moment. Great to talk. All right, all right, from the edge of the English Channel. Let's have now to Oxford, where on and men and is director of the UK in a changing Europe. That's a think tank with a focus on Brexit. Welcome. Thank you having me Want to scale from solid wind to utter disaster. Where would you put this deal very much towards the wind side because by the time we reached sort of Christmas, and of course, the deal was finally done on Christmas Eve. We have a binary choice, which was between deal and no deal. No deal would have been significantly more disruptive significantly more costly and I think, as importantly and no deal outcome would have set the UK and its European partners of loggerheads. Each side blamed the other for the collapse of the talks, and that would have got in the way of cooperation on security. Climate on all kinds of things for weeks, if not months, So compared to that outcome, a deal is a wind from the American perspective. Britain's role as a global leader has been crucial. I mean, the UK has a permanent seat on the U. N Security Council. It's a powerful force in NATO. How do you see that changing after this Brexit deal? And when I say is the one that you miss there is that the UK is also being useful to the U. S. As a friend inside the European Union. That is to say, an Atlanticist liberal free trading state that could shape you decisions and make the case for Atlantis is, um and free trade at the heart of the European Union. I think the U. S. Will miss that. I suspect the UK will make efforts to be an even more activist foreign policy player. Because the government is keen to ram home that message we might have turned our back on European Union membership. But we haven't turned our back on the world or on our responsibilities as a key defender of the liberal international Order. I'm curious is a person who has devoted your professional life to following this saga over the years. Can you just tell us how you Personally feel now that this deal has finally happened, I found I found every step of the journey very, very interesting because so many weird and wonderful things have happened in British politics wonderful, broadly defined from the perspective of a political scientist. You could not how you could not hope to live through or interesting time to study the politics of your country. The other thing for me that is fascinating, though, is that many people, many people who supported Brexit leaving the European Union wasn't and ended itself. It was a means to an end. That is to say, if we leave the European Union, then we can doctor thought you fill in that blank because you won't become a more activist international player Deregulating away. The European Union would never let us so Actually, The real test of Brexit in many ways is yet to come. Which is now you've got that freedom. What the hell are you going to do with it? And how are you going to make people's lives better because of it, despite the fact You're in charge of an economy that is growing less fast. Then it would have done Had we not left in the first place. On and men in is director of the U. K and a change in Europe and professor of European politics and foreign affairs at King's College. London. Thank you for talking with us on this historic day. Absolute pleasure and happy New Year to you. You're listening to all things considered from NPR news. Let's head out to Pacific and now with Hillary Walker And that's where we have one South.
KCRW
"liberal international" Discussed on KCRW
"It does today? I think there could I mean, remember, Brexit is really about the idea of national sovereignty. It's not about economics, and this is how Boris Johnson put it. On Christmas Eve. When he finally got that trade deal, the British people voted to take back control of their money their borders. They're lose. And, of course, that's in an economic cost. Ari. Another potential scenario where Brexit looks a little better, Is it politically The U becomes even harder to manage and the U. K in the end is glad that I got out when it did. It's NPR's Frank Langfitt. Thank you for all of your coverage of this story over the years, and particularly today on this historic moment, Great to talk, Ari. All right, from the edge of the English Channel. Let's head now to Oxford, where on and men and is director of the UK in a changing Europe. That's a think tank with a focus on Brexit. Welcome. Thank you having me Well on a scale from solid wind to utter disaster. Where would you put this deal very much towards the wind side because by the time we reached sort of Christmas, and of course, the deal was finally done on Christmas Eve. We had a binary choice, which was between deal and no deal. No deal would have been significantly more disruptive significantly more costly And I think, as importantly and no deal outcome would have set the UK and its European partners of loggerheads. Each side blamed the other for the collapse of the talks, and that would have got in the way of cooperation on security. On climate on all kinds of things for weeks, if not months, So compared to that outcome, a deal is a wind from the American perspective. Britain's role as a global leader has been crucial. I mean, the UK has a permanent seat on the U. N Security Council. It's a powerful force in NATO. How do you see that changing after this Brexit deal? I mean, when I say is the one that you miss there is that the UK is also being useful to the U. S. As a friend inside the European Union. That is to say, an Atlanticist liberal free trading state that could shape EU decisions and make the case for Atlantis is, um and free trade at the heart of the European Union. I think the U. S. Will miss that I suspect the UK will make efforts to be an even more activist foreign policy player. Because the government is keen to ram home that message we might have turned our back on European Union membership. We haven't turned our back on the world or on our responsibilities as a key defender of the liberal international Order. I'm curious is a person who has devoted your professional life to following this saga over the years. Can you just tell us how you Personally feel now that this deal has finally happened, I found I found every step of the journey very, very interesting because so many weird and wonderful things have happened in British politics wonderful, broadly defined from the perspective of a political scientist. You could not, you could not hope to live through or interesting time to study the politics of your country. The other thing for me that is fascinating, though, is that many people, many people who supported Brexit leaving the European Union wasn't and ended itself. It was a means to an end. That is to say, if we leave the European Union, then we can Doctor thought you fill in that blank because you won't become a more activist international player Deregulating the way the European you would never let us so Actually, The real test of Brexit in many ways is yet to come. Which is now you've got that freedom. What the hell are you going to do with it? And how are you going to make people's lives better because of it, despite the fact That you're in charge of an economy that is growing less fast. Then it would have done Had we not left in the first place. On and two men in is director of the U. K and a change in Europe and professor of European politics and foreign affairs at King's College. London. Thank you for talking with us on this historic day. Absolute pleasure and happy New Year to you. You're listening to all.
Between The Lines
Has Trump broken the 'rules-based international order'?
"Today on the show discussion with a renowned expert about the so-called rules based international order. It's been grabbing headlines vs. Now, how often have you heard that term, the rose by store is not perfect. We are rallying the noble nations of the world to build a new liberal order, that prevents war achieves greater prosperity for all. I have never heard. I Chinese leader commit so explicitly to rule based international order. So what do you think it actually means now for many politicians and journalists the world in which we leave the institutions of governance, the rules norms, all that, that's largely inspired by the kind of allegedly but nine global leadership that the United States. Is exercise for decades. And yet, would you believe it? The rules based international order itself has become a popular expression, only in recent times, did effective research, such of the world's newspapers and news wise. And it shows these things that in the three decades from ninety five to twenty fifteen the expression was used on three hundred nineteen occasion. That's three hundred eight times in thirty. That's all, however, get a lot of this in the past four years since Donald Trump announces presidential campaign, the term has been used nearly six thousand times six thousand times in the past four years. And about three hundred and twenty in the previous thirties, extrordinary now to me, the logic is simple. Western journalists scholars politicians policy makers, they all too often refer to this Liberal International order rules. Based international order. Why? Because it's demise is primarily blamed on one Donald Trump from this day forward, it's going to be only America first America first. Now the conventional wisdom goes lock these ball rising tariffs weakening alliances withdrawing the US from international agreements and supping with the devil, from Kim Jong Hoon that Singapore to Ladimir Putin hill, stinky, the US president has lifted void in world leadership. This is the argument as a result, Trump has undermined Feith in the open free, international order of the post Cold War era. But Trump alone really, to blind for the unraveling of the Liberal International auto or was this rules based order. So beloved of the western elites was at bound to file will my guest today has spent a lot of time. Thinking about this issue, John Measham is no stranger to this program. He's professor of political science at the university of Chicago. He's the author most recently of the great delusion liberal, drains and international realities published by ya'll university, Chris. And he's article bound to file the and full of Liberal International order that appears in the current issue of the academic journal, International Security, John joins us today from a studio on campus. The university of Chicago. Get I John welcome to the program. Thank you, Tom. I'm glad to be here now. It seems that this rules base Liberal International order is in trouble is Trump to blind. No, I think it is the conventional wisdom among the foreign policies. Tablet meant here in the United States, and probably in Australia that Trump is responsible for wrecking the Liberal International order. And once he is disposed of in twenty twenty and we get a new president someone like Joe Biden, we'll go back to the old way of doing business in the Liberal International order will survive. I think this is a deeply flawed way of thinking about what's happening with regard to that order that order was in deep trouble before, Trump got elected, just think the Iraq war, the Afghans, STAN war, the fiasco and Libya defeat. Lasko in Syria to Gasco over Ukraine, to two thousand eight financial crisis, the euro zone crisis Brexit, just a name of few of the problems. What Trump did when he ran for president in two thousand sixteen was he pointed out all these failures. He said, the Liberal International order was bankrupt and he got away. Acted and he got elected because many voters, clearly understood that he was correct. So the argument that Trump is responsible for wrecking the Liberal International. Order is dead wrong by what distinguished Trump from a lot of the Republicans and Democrats in two thousand sixteen was he's belief that democracy was not an expo commodity, and you think about it, John thirty years ago. This she had the full of the Berlin Wall, the claps Ivy, communism and the consensus that ease ago, I roll friend Francis, Fukuyama democracy was the wife of the future, what happened. I think that would happened was that we came to find out that not everyone in the world likes democracy, you and I may think it is the best system. But the fact is that they're all sorts of other people world, especially if you go to a place like Russia today, who would prefer an alternative form of political system. And in this case, it soft the -tarian his, so if you're in the business of trying to spread democracy around the world as the United States was in its pursuit of liberal. Gemini, what you discover is an extremely difficult task and it's an especially difficult task. If you use military force to spread democracy. In other words, you try to spread democracy at the end of a sword. And this, of course, is what we tried to do in Afghanistan. And in Iraq, it was with the Bush doctrine was all about, and those ended up being close. Oh failures, you'll critics will say though. Not standing all these setbacks that isn't it inevitable that as human con progresses than the prospects for democratization, and universal peace are enhanced and that, you know it was seeing this right now. There's still talk that China will eventually become a liberal democracy in these protests in Hong Kong that we've witnessed in the past fortnight that shows that eventually, China will buck, and become more liberal, democratic signed thing for Russia. How'd you respond to that? I just don't think it's inevitable. I mean, I want to be very clear, I think democracy is the best political system, and I think it would be a good thing if every country on the planet was liberal democracy. But the idea that that is inevitable as simply wrong. The fact is that Uman beings find it very difficult to agree on questions of what is the best life? What is the best political system, and would Frank Fukuyama and others? Assumed when the Cold War came to a conclusion was that everybody in the world. Wanted to live in a state, that was a liberal democracy. And therefore, with fictive -ly had the winded our back in our endeavour to spread liberal democracy, all across the planet, but that assumption has proven to be wrong. The fact is that the spread of democracy is not inevitable. And by the way, if you go back to two thousand six fast forward to the present what you see is that the number of democracies in the world is decreasing not increase. I think the New York buys freedom house's documented that. It's come down something like ten percent in the last ten or so years. Raw joan. It has. And that is regrettable. But it just points out that this is not inevitable. And again, if you get into the business trying to sprint liberal democracy when it's not an edible. And there are viable, alternatives, you're going to run into a whole his just as a conventional wisdom's are often wrong guy back to that consensus at the end of the Cold War that democracy was the wife of the future. One orthodoxy, that's also Baynes smashed in the last that he is. John is argument that nationalism was a thing of the past on the eve of the European parliamentary elections as Jordan, Claude Juncker. He's a leading European bureaucrat. He was asked about the growing reactions about, you know, against Brussels and the AU and the rise of nationalist movements across Europe. This is from CNN in general with the with the EU elections coming up, the euro skeptical right-wing forces seemed to be very strong in many countries. How does how much does that concern? You why do you think that is what's wrong with the what's your? We'll just. And if that wasn't tone-deaf enough, he added these populous necessarily stupid necessarily his day, I love the country and they don't like the others. Join me Sharma. What do you make of comments? I think it's a remarkably foolish comment. The fact is that virtually every leader of a western democracy is a nationalist just take, Madeleine Albright, who was once secretary of state here in the United States and is viewed as a canonical liberal. She's also a nationalist at heart. She wants famously said that America is the indispensable nation. We stand taller and we see further if you think about her words, she is saying, America is the indispensable, and I underline the word nation. That's at the heart of nationalism virtually every leader, whether it's an Australian or. Japanese or German leader feels that his or her country is something very special in their deeply devoted to that country. That's what nationalism is all about. And what you had in the post Cold War, period up until very recently is a situation where liberalism and nationalism coexisted, but hardly anybody ever talked about nationalism. But once the Liberal International order began to crumble people began to talk more and more about nationalism. And they felt at a lot of those liberal policies in fringed on national policies and on nationalism and ways that they didn't like, and the end result is, you got Brexit and Britain, and you got Trump and the United States and you know what you have in places like Poland and Hungary as well. So in nineteen states clash with multilateral institutions, nationalism, always Trump's liberalism that show alone. My view is that liberalism and Nash. Nationalism can coexist. But when particular liberal policies begin to bump up against nationalism, nationalism will be liberalism, every time because we are all ultimately social animals. We are all alternately very tribal in our nation matters to us greatly. I think virtually every Australian cares greatly about Australian sovereignty just like every American cares about American sovereignty.