3 Burst results for "Coalition Provisional Authority"
Between The Lines
"coalition provisional authority" Discussed on Between The Lines
"What did some of these folks all have in common? Well, their parents were significant donors to former president George W. Bush and his Republican Party in the United States. And early on, this was seen as a sort of signature, go to Baghdad, have your CV stamped with having spent some time out there. It'll be a cushy assignment and you can then go on with your life. The problem was that the assignment and Baghdad was actually complicated one and an important one and one that called for individuals with real subject matter expertise with language skills. With skills working in post conflict environments and yet Washington didn't send those people, it sent a bunch of sycophants in some cases who were in some of whom were even asked about their views on subjects such as abortion and capital punishment before they were sent to Iraq. Because no question these decisions made by the Bush administration and you mentioned bremer there who was in charge of the coalition provisional authority, sure, disbanding the Iraq army, the debate of the government institutions that you mentioned. And also the amateur sycophants who worked for the U.S. government being placed in Iraq, that made a bad situation worse, but could more planning really have turned this western occupation of an Arab land into a liberation. I mean, this is a point that say your critics might say, didn't the occupation and then the free elections just replace a minority Sunni order with a majority sheer order for the first time setting Shia versus Sunni. Rajiv. That's a very good point. And it's very true. Iraq was a tinderbox. And in Saddam, through his brutality, kept a lid on a pressure cooker. And so it was always going to be difficult. It was always going to be a little violent.
860AM The Answer
"coalition provisional authority" Discussed on 860AM The Answer
"Have just expressed yet again, you're just made at the international news media. In fact, the reporting does. Actually show there are some certain number of Iraqi citizens that have spoken on camera quite directly about their own concerns about the safety and security in Baghdad. In that situation, there have also been absolutely verified reports that it is not just regime targets been in hospitals, banks. Other facilities essential to society. The CRC has been on TV today, saying that hospitals are being looted, not regime targets. They're speaking up and that they can't even get there to resupply these essential hospitals. Now my question is General Brooks said this morning that the military U. S military did not want to reconstruct the Iraqi police force in Baghdad because the feeling of the U. S military was that that Iraqi police force had been operating against the U. S military and he didn't Well, that was a secure solution. So with some specificity, what type of Iraqi fourth can you bring to bear in Baghdad to have Iraqis help restore security and what types of specific tasks are you now going to assign the U. S military to do to help restore the situation Which the people back that appear to be concerned about, Um hospitals. Mhm. Let's go back to what you said about people. You could take a camera and a microphone and stick it in front of 1000 people in Iraq today and you could find someone saying every single thing you've said, and every single thing I've said they're going to find it all across the spectrum. You know that It's the facts on the ground where a person is that determines how they feel about it. And there are some very dangerous places in that country and some very difficult situations. And there was no question but there is a hospital that was looted. There also is this fact. The Saddam Hussein regime and the bath Party put their headquarters in hospitals all over that country. They have been doing it systematically. Have we been Complaining about that. Have we been photographing that? Have we been bemoaning that know why? Because Donald Rumsfeld was speaking on April the 11th. 40 days later. Worst decision in the Iraq war not to invade. The decision to disband the Iraqi army was made by Ambassador Paul Bremer. The head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, and more chaos came 4500. Americans lost their lives in Iraq and the uniform. Thousands more contractors. Tens of thousands wounded. It remains a controversial subject. I will discuss it with Ambassador Michael Oren today. Former Senator Jim Talent, I'll be talking about it with Senator Tom Cotton, who served in Iraq. Rumsfeld. Rumsfeld. Was a great secretary of defense. Let me move to my relief factor. Com endorsement and my daily pick of it, Um out yesterday in the ridiculous 97 degree.
Jocko Podcast
The Unravelling 4: War Party
"This is the Jaakko on Raveling podcast episode four. With Daryl, Cooper and me, Jaakko willink. And, we're about to pick up the thread. Of JAAKKO GOING TO WAR I WanNa read something from. Tom ricks book fiasco early part from the earliest part of the invasion because I want to give people an idea of. The fire. You were jumping into in September, October. Two thousand three, so the war started in March. and. The conventional forces the Iraqis the resistance in the cities. Is precisely the match for the US military that you think it is, and we burn through them and. The Third Infantry Division gets up into Baghdad quick. They take the airport they make their thunder runs through the city, and the regime collapses very rapidly. That's in March early April. And this passage is. Referring, to appear now April into May. Quote. Baghdad was falling apart in front of the eyes of the US military with buildings, being looted and parents afraid to let their children outside, but no one had orders to do anything about it. Looking back several years later, Colonel Colonel Allan King the head of Civil Affairs for three ID spoke of April, two thousand, three with slow chilled tone of horror and his voice. I got to Baghdad was told. You've got twenty four hours to come up with a phase four plan. On the night of April eight Colonel John Sterling Chief of staff of three ID came to me, and said I just got off the phone with the court chief of staff, and I asked him for the reconstruction plan, and he said there isn't one so you've got twenty four hours to come up with one. King was stunned. He had been asking for months for just such a plan and had been told that when the time came, he would be given it. Lacking clear orders about what to do once. In Baghdad, the Third Infantry Division more or less stayed in place in the capital. You didn't find many dismounted patrols with three ID recalled J. Garner a retired army general, not one to lightly criticize his old peers. Kind of stayed with their platforms. That is their. And Bradley Fighting Vehicles. On April. Sixth Lieutenant Douglas Hoyt a platoon leader with three. Id saw looters for the first time. I remembered looking through the sights on my tank at people and trying to determine if they were hostile or not, he recalled later. He didn't stop them. It was not our mission at the time. The divisions official actor Action Review. States that. It had no orders to do anything else. Quote. Third Infantry Division transitioned into phase four SASSO. That's a security and stability ops with no plan from higher H. Q. IT reported. There was no guidance for restoring order in Baghdad creating an interim government, hiring government and essential services, employees, and ensuring that the judicial system was operational. The result was. A power and authority vacuum created by our failure to immediately replace key government institutions. The president announced that our national goal was regime change. This is still reading from the thirty report. That our national goal was regime change yet. There was no timely plan prepared for the obvious consequences of regime change. As a matter of law and fact, the United States is an occupying power in Iraq even if we characterize ourselves as liberators. Because of the refusal to acknowledge our occupier, status commanders did not initially take measures available to occupying powers such as imposing curfews, directing civilians to return to work and controlling the local government in populous. The failure to act after we displaced the regime creating a power vacuum, which others immediately tried to fill. Now. I. Know that War is very confusing. Thing and nobody has a plan after the first punch thrown the fight. There were. Some decisions made in the earliest days of this war that I find pretty inexplicable specifically because they went against the advice of the military and the intelligence establishment, and they were made seemingly for ideological and political. L. Paul Bremmer he was the civilian who was. Sent over to head the Coalition Provisional Authority the CPA the civilian authority structure in Iraq.