S E5: China Will Be on Mars, and America Will Be an Island


Welcome to twenty thirty eight the podcast where we interrogate the future in the future. China will be on Mars in America will be an island. Here's Burnham assays. The year is twenty thirty eight ninety years after the founding of the People's Republic following its century of national humiliation. China stood up became rich and elderly grew more and more powerful Belton road. It's economic monster pine he's now complete a bridge crossing the Caspian Sea two hundred kilometers from us. Average took manage tan has made ruled transport between Europe and China fast and easy changing all mental map, separating continent. Dramatically nuclear power spacecraft have been used for the first man Chinese Marshon mission. There is an you global political and economic order and China is at the center it will be about power and money. But more surprising, perhaps this is an order about values. You've values of modern Chinese civilisation. I m Burnham assigns. I am a former politician. I was a minister of European affairs in Portugal for two years. Now. I'm a writer and living in Beijing. I'm max read. Paris terrified or Chinese feature. But unable to see it clearly. So I think it might be good to start off by telling our listeners some of them may not know what the belts in Rhode initiative is exactly what it is. And what it aims to do since in your your sort of picture of twenty thirty eight. I mean, you sketched the infrastructure cheap. It's very very clearly, but what does the Belsen road initiative in? What was it conceived to achieve the Belton road is essentially a plan a master plan a big geopolitical NGO economic plan to transform the world to transform the world. Order the world political and economic order to give it a new content. Give it new values to give new principals give it new rules. But also, of course to place China at the center if you wanna look for an equivalent, and I've thought about this for a while. I think the idea of the west is the best equivalent to the Belton road. It's a metaphor. But it's meant to represent a certain political order. Where the United States where at the center the Belton road is a direct rival to the west. I mean, one thing that's interesting to hear you say that is that here in America, even people who are sort of decently news literate think of the belt road, basically is an infrastructure initiative that it's about building highways that connect and central Asia and Europe to China. So what's the relationship between those infrastructural components in the kind of political order that it envisions? And why do you think of it as much bigger and larger kind of set of political goals? Infrastructure is a means infrastructure is a way to start designing certain map to start connecting points to starting altering the political geography of continents, the Chinese don't think about infrastructure as being about connecting two points. They think about it as a complete comprehensive development plan when do you think about a port? They think about the city there's going to be next to the port and industrial area. There's going to be next to the city, and they think about division of labor immediately. What is this Syrian this port going to produce can connect with another city and another port. So you start moving the pieces on the map, and the infrastructure is just the way of doing that. At the end you end up with a new economic order. And of course, who has the wealth who has the money can also dictate political terms. It is first of all about trade, and in particular to organize these very complex production chains, which is gonna have the most high value segments of the. Production chain and he's going to distribute the rest worldwide you need infrastructure for this. But the political will political capacity. The political influence is really the core of the initiative. So I think it's always good to start with the infrastructure, but we have to be very careful not to stop there. It's only the beginning of the story. That's looking at it from the perspective of the toppling of one superpower and the sort of essential another. But there's also some logical components, right? It's not just a matter of China seizing the sort of top position. They also want to change the way that business and politics is is done in the world, right? So I think the form the the basic structure is not that different from let's say the American empire of the last one hundred years, the content the values that are central to to the initiative into the plan are very different. I've thought about this. And I've I've I've come come out come up with this expression. The Belton road will be a world of soothsayers saints and spokes and let me take very quickly each by turn. I think it will be a world turn to the future with people trying to guess what? The future will be like people trying to transform the future technologists of all kinds. That's what I see in China right now, it will be a world where more relations will be more important than they are now which will feel that it deserves gratitude from other countries that other countries had to respect the power that China has it will be very moralize. And finally, you will be very opaque the idea. Is of the alignment of transparency of public reason public accountability those won't be central anymore. This will be a world very similar to the security clearance levels of let us say the department of defense in the United States. Some people will know everything that is happening. There's will know only a bit others will know nothing. It will not be talked about openly in the newspapers that's already drew, by the way, someone researching and writing on the Belton road has a hard time getting to the core of the information we need, and it will only get worse from that point of view. I'm interested in where we are sort of right now with the Belton road. What what stuff has been built what the plan over the next twenty years will look like. And if you think there's a sort of particular tipping point that will affirm what you're saying that will make it clear in a way that it hasn't become clear yet that China is leading this global new political world order five years in. In there. Still isn't a lot of detail. There are muster plans of different kinds individualized by country in many instances, and now it's the second stage has to do with concrete projects a few are already being developed, but not so many. So I know you say the plans are not well known that there's some masterplans, but if the kind of the basic bits of it, according to Xi Jinping have been set out. What what's what can we expect to come? Like, what what other projects what other ideas? What others have moved China might make can we expect to come over the next twenty years another way to put it would be how do we track? What's happening, and what would be the important developments that would allow us to say, it's working or not working? I think different kinds of things if one country started to show signs of economic growth and development, and it was very clear that this was due to the Belton road. One could think of Pakistan, for example, or Kazakhstan that. That would be a turning point where one could say could say it's working if China has a breakthrough moment in some important technology put Nick moment of some kind. Then one could say the strategy of moving to the top of the value chain of the global value chain is also working if there is a major infrastructure project that really captures the imagination of people worldwide. There's now this road this bridge, of course, in Lincoln mccowan, Hong Kong, but something even at a higher level. I think all these things would would be important milestones. And we we still don't have one that has been able to capture people's imagination in this way. Can I ask you to speculate? A little bit about what Sputnik moment might be for China. I've been spending a lot of time visiting companies in artificial intelligence, and I see some very interesting things happening here on the side of innovation and research, but also underside of just getting those ideas, very. Quickly into the street and into people's habits. This is already very visible in in any major Chinese city. If we have a really significant development in artificial intelligence or in bioengineering with really significant augmentation for human capacities. I think in one of these two wary as we are going to see something within the next five or ten years is gonna make front pages everywhere and kind of scare Americans. Probably Jan just as it happened with put neck, I think in that sense. I expect history to repeat itself, and then we're going to be see support of activity from the United States. So you don't imagine that the US will sort of respond to the ascent of China the way that Britain responded to the center of the US and just sort of stand aside, you think that they'll be a a period of intense rivalry looks more like intense rivalry. That's what I would have guessed. And in the last year has shown this I see that kind of accommodation in resignation. A lot in Russia. Russia is sort of accepted that China knows how to do comic growth in. Russia doesn't quite remarkable two years ago. They were still saying in Moscow we are going to follow. China's example now they've sort of given up China has the economic might we don't they say in Moscow. So we see that example in the case of Russia in the case of the US. No, we will not going to see it. There's much more of a sense that here we have two completely opposite models and only one of them can survive. You think there'll be no time in the future when the United States will find it self functionally kind of client state of a Chinese superpower, you think America will always choose to see itself as a rival to China, even if that means sort of suffering the punishments of trying to be a rival too much more powerful country. Let me tell you what I think would be the the the the worst case scenario or the catastrophic scenario for the United States short of a major war would be for China to extend control over the old world Europe, Asia and measure parts of Africa and the United States become an island an island on the shores of of this immense supercontinent controlled by China. You would become very peripheral perhaps life would still be comfortable, but he would have no voice outside. It's it's boarders. And it will really be relegated to to the state as of of a marginal island, which by the way is kind of how it appears in Chinese maps of. The Belton road because the map simply ignore the United States. It's on the reverse side of the map. It has these appear in the rest of all these they're meant to be controlled by China to mention, you know, one catastrophic outcome of this would be war between the US and China. I mean, how likely is that we're talking about the, you know, the US obviously seen China's a rival superpower a moment that really spooks the the Americans and China, obviously, there's sort of no looking back for it at this point, it it sees the prize here. I mean, how likely is this actually this escalates into open armed conflict between China the United States. I think conflict between China and the United States is to some extent inevitable, then we have to ask what kind of conflict, and I also happen to think that conflict in the twenty percent or he's going to be very different. It will be not open mostly non-military, although he could have. Devastating consequences, but it will be focused on things like infrastructure trade, the internet and the war of ideas. So when we say conflict is on your eyes and doesn't necessarily mean war in the traditional twentieth century meaning of the time. But it means something like a trade war, which we already have. And if you if you could get you out a little bit for us, the war of ideas, part of that you mentioned earlier that, you know, some some aspects of what life sort of under an empowered Chinese regime would look like soothsayers saints and spokes right? That sort of seems intuitive to me as a picture of life in China or directly under Chinese rule. But I'm curious how you see the appeal of the Chinese worldview being pitched to parts of the world that have been put last half century or so turning towards this out of the United States, and how it might come to be that China would sort of bring them into their orbit. Is it just a matter of the economic opportunities that they offer or is there some kind of ideological appeal as well, I think there's a there's an ideological appeal which you don't find anywhere else. I don't think that Russia has a particularly plausible powerful appeal to anyone into west, but China does it starting to have. And in my opinion. It's bays on this idea of the future openness towards the future. I'm here in Beijing. And part of the reason is I wanna see some of these developments that are happening a lot faster here in China than in the west. And lots of people are going to be attracted to this idea that in order to see the future you have to come to Beijing Chen. There's a lot of leads a lot of truth in this partly also because we into west are now. So paralyzed we have lost his appetite for the future. We have become very afraid of technology. So I can see a time not that far off ten or twenty years in the future where young people in Europe, particularly in Europe. But also in the United States will be attracted to the science fiction civilization that that that is a growing China, and it's not a coincidence that in fact, when you think about the appeal of Chinese ideas outside China's borders one area that has made spectacular progress is science fiction young people all over the world reading Chinese science fiction. There's something to this China, and he's increasingly appropriating the future and the idea of the future. Personally, I feel that. Appeal myself. I'm I'm not sure that I'll ever get all the way to living over there. But I think about it a lot the thing that pulls me back is that there's so many features of life in China that seem frankly terrifying. I mean, all of the surveillance digressive chevelle say there, you know, the the concentration camps and Xinjiang as the kind of most extreme version of the upstate terror there. But I think a lot of people in the US in particular ah decade or two decades ago might have thought well at some point China will be the preeminent world power. But for them to get there. They'll have to become much more comfortably westernized, they'll become a China that looks more like the US just four five times bigger. But it seems less five years, especially they've taken a much more authoritarian turn had you see that playing into the sort of science. Action appeal to non-chinese, do you think it'll be a an impediment or do you think it's sort of part of the time fiction bargains that the science fiction movies that we like they are still in some sense on day. You know? You gonna say. Runner is is a nice pleasant place to to spend your holidays. Hope part of it is going to be part of the bargain. Other part China will have to if China wants to be successful and to build a world empire. Some things that you talked about we'll have to appear, and I think they they will eventually they haven't already realized that that it is hurting their ability to replace the United States and appeal to people's hearts all over the world. But of course, you know, we've seen this in our own history nineteenth century Europe early. Twentieth century America were places where you paid a high price for having a new future and China now, he's very willing to pay that price. One thing you see immediately in Chinese that. There's not a lot of concern about the impact of technology on jobs because the impact will be felt by the two hundred and fifty or three hundred million migrant workers, which are in some respect all the part from the. Middle class and the middle class. Simply does not see these people what they see is the positive effect of technology, and they don't even have any understanding of the car, they won't pay them. And of course, the migrant workers, they have no political influence, and they will be readily sacrificed to this process of capturing the next strategic technology of the. I'm sort of interested in the question. I mean, we're talking about soft power here. You know, the US has always exercised soft power best through sort of mass, popular media and culture through Hollywood through pop music, obviously, China has huge movie and music industries, but they have had mixed success sort of breaking out of the Chinese markets. And I'm wondering if you think that is something that they care about them. And it's going to change something that's going to have to change for them to sort of realize successor looking to to achieve. Yes, I think it will be slow. It's always slow. This is the most difficult part of the process of becoming a superpower, I told you before that there's one interesting phenomenon of science fiction, which is really being read everywhere, and he's sort of the most powerful science fiction the world right now, I met a science fiction writer today earlier today here in Beijing. And I asked her precisely. That I after Europe created new cultural forms in the nineteenth century America, created jazz and rock and roll in the twentieth century wars, China creating that can appeal to the whole world in the same way that these art forms appeal to the whole an answer was this new variety of talk shows that exist in China that everyone watches where everything can be talked about for hours on end. I've checked them out. They are different from American talk shows, and they are more unpredictable. Anything can come up. They are mixture of a talk show in a reality show, but still I wasn't entirely convinced. And of course, there's the obstacle of language cinema. Hasn't been particularly successful contemporary art has and there's a huge contemporary art scene in Beijing that are very much like to to to see and to witness. So there's progress in some areas, but this is clearly more difficult than the rest. I mean, speaking of the language barrier. This is this is always on China's going to have to overcome is using to making Mandarin replace English as the sort of lingua franca of the world. Yes. But there's a lot happening there as well. Let me give you an if you examples I traveled two years ago. He knows Becker STAN, and it was already fifty fifty between people signing up for mentoring classes in English classes, and he wouldn't necessarily think that it was Becker's town is not part of Chinese cultural sphere. It's become quite normal for a westerners to at least speak a little bit of mandatory. I've noticed that people in Beijing sometimes now actually expected at least a little bit. And that was not the case when I started coming to China fifteen years ago, there's there's a renewed interest in Mandarin. And I would not be surprised. In fact, I find it almost inevitable in some countries. We didn't ten or fifteen years Mandarin will be more popular than English one sort of word or or a few words that haven't come up once in this conversation, so far communism Marxism, and I'm wondering. The extent to which you see Marxist or Leninists values or Maoist us for that matter sort of as a component of the ideology of of the road initiative of the new Chinese superpower, you know, you you mentioned almost Confucian values. Veasley Marxism is also kind of deeply moral politics in some way. And I'm sorry. I'm just interested in what role communist politics play in this. It plays a big role. And you see it everywhere you see Marx's men, communism everywhere in contemporary China. But it has to be let me put it this way, you need to have red marks actually at least a little bit of it. It's not the marks of of the sort of journalistic marks Marquesa that we associated with the communist minutes of union or in Cuba. It's not that marks the marks that. For example, talked about technology as the driver of history. That's true of China today. It's the marks that always thought in terms of social changes and not individual changes for marks idea that Steve Jobs. He's going to change the world. He's laughable and for Chinese leaders. It's laughable, but it's not laughable for us. We actually believe that the individual can change history. Not for marks. It's also. The idea that that Easter has different stages. So there are important. It's it's the idea that the economy is more fundamental than ideas. And that ideas will eventually follow economic power. There's lots of Marxist ideas. Let me give you a final example the idea that there's an international system of power, which dictates your fate economically as a nation, and that you have to change the global system in order to rise to the top. We don't quite believe in this. It seems to us that everyone can do their own thing and be successful. But of course, for marks and for contemporary Chinese leaders, you need a sort of a worldwide revolution to change your economic fate. And that's what about road is about is about bringing about a worldwide revolution. So to answer your question directly. I actually see Marxism everywhere in in contemporary, China, but he's just not not the communists of documents. Stories about life in Cuba or in the Soviet Union or North Korea. Well, I one thing that I wanted to get to that. We don't have to go into too much depth than that. I was I was in your in your conversation. The conversations we've been having running up to the show. I was interested in this sort of picture of life sort of hints of pictures of life as an American and Chinese dominated world, or as the or as a European say in one of the things you mentioned was that sort of games we play based on euro American archetypes like Cowboys and Indians are going to be replaced by Chinese cultural archetypes, and I was just wondering if you could talk like, so, you know, in one vision of his future, you have kids who are playing Cowboys and Indians that are playing journey to the west or they're playing sort of Chinese legends and stuff. I was wondering if you talk about that a little bit. Yes, I think that's as striking way to put it. Let me say, however, that I don't think the penetration of this Chinese world, or there will be entirely universal, by the way, the west was never really able to penetrate. China. It's not like Chinese kids playing Indian in Kabul is in one of the striking things about traveling Chinese precisely seeing that these archetypes which are present everywhere in Russian Brazil in South Africa. I'm not present in China. So it may be the case that this Chinese archetypes will not be able to penetrate the midwest or southern Europe or provincial towns in Germany, but that doesn't quite matter. Because if they are universal if most of mankind which by that time will be as wealthy as as as many countries in the west if most of mankind is attracted by these archetypes, those that are not will feel like the Chinese failed two hundred years ago, increasingly on the margins of history, not understanding what is happening or best case scenario just watching what is happening, but not participating. I think that would be almost as bad or one could argue even worse than. Than to be absorbed by the Chinese archetype Bruno. Thank you so much for joining us. This has been a sobering discussion. And and we really appreciate it. Thanks, greg. Thank you so much fun. All right, David. Let's talk about the likelihood of Bruno's prediction, how likely do you think that this is going to happen? I sort of I two minds about I think my American pride and western like innate western just biases me against it a little bit. I mean, obviously, China is a growing economic Pima say have these grand geopolitical aspirations, and you know, certainly at least of less years and probably over the last couple of decades the US has been in a bit of retreat. But I still when I think forward I still can't quite get my head around like while. I'm still middle aged that the world will be really operating in a Chinese image. And I I'm sure that's my own prejudice rather than like really logical thinking about like the grand just Arkell narratives that play. But I have to. I just think like. They shot themselves in the foot before. I I sort of I sort of hand imagine a seamless a at least two happening so quickly. Even though I see all the writing on the wall and see it as a totally logical conclusion of the way things are heading now. It's hard to say. I mean, it's the kind of thing where it seems the next say five years are going to be to me at least seem feel like they're going to be extremely important to figuring out. Exactly how the new sort of the world order is gonna shake out over the next twenty years. You know, as is this is Ray wing pipe to me part of this question. Not just about this China have it's shit together to do it because it certainly seems to have its together more than it's had in the past. But it's also does the west have it's shit together to to sort of to to slow. This rise to fend it off in some way. And I think, you know, the the elections of the next decade are going to be very important to determining whether or not that is in fact, the case, I thought this was it seems credible to me. I mean, I think that in many ways, this is like Bruno's take his exactly what the Chinese government would like to hear or or, you know, not what they would like to hear in the sense that they that. They're so eager to be listening to our podcast, though. Oh, I hope they are. You know, I think this is like this is the Chinese plan. And I think that it's it's a pretty good one that that especially, you know, the the way they think about relating infrastructural projects to global power is like it's not a new insight, but they seem to be doing better than anybody else's right now. And so to the extent that that sort of altogether forms a coherent vision of how the future might play out. I think it it's it strikes me as extremely credible. It seems like the thing that's really sticks. With me is you know, his his repeated emphasis, which I'm sure is earned through experience of China's faith in the future. And, you know, just think of like, you know, Peter Teal's line about flying cars, and Robert Gordon and the end of growth, and I do think that like as much as we are enamored of our little like devices in the west we actually don't really think that the world can change all that much. We think it can get a little bit better. And maybe like people who are like a little bit worse off. We'll get a little bit better off. But the kinds of dramatic world changing transformations that we used to not just imagine. But then like put into practice put it, you know, make real just doesn't really seem to be a part of our culture anymore, and it's sort of a contrast to to see in China. The opposite happen. Thing where nobody has much. For the past at all. They're just like excited to see what the future can do for them. You know? But I think that's it's you know, we talked a little bit with him. But it is interesting to think about it in terms of. In terms of climate in particular, like the the superpower astride, the world's responsible for every inch of our infrastructure. They're also going to be like blame if that infrastructure fails. Or if it, you know, contributes to widespread suffering through, you know, like, I think. They're pouring more concrete in China than the US port in the whole twentieth century every three years and concrete is like a mirror, and you know, there's so many things about what they're doing that are making the planet worse off as they're trying to sort of seize ownership of it. And while there are inevitably going to be economic opportunities there. I also wonder about some kind of like global backlash to a what is seen as a. Self interested empire in the west is always been putting forward as a in a way that was cleared outsiders, self deluded. But there was like a the delusion was the. The west was not just acting at a self interest. But out of broader principle, and you know, to to like expand on his point about this sort of moral politics of China to if that if that self interested empire, and the building infrastructure is connected in a very explicit rhetorical way to gratitude, and you know, sort of debt some sort of moral debt that that obviously is not going to you know, that that is not a great way to kind of form to to wield soft power. Let's say, but you know, I mean, even to your point about climate change. There's also a chance becomes a sort of pure victory that you you become the global superpower globe that that nobody wants to live on anymore or that nobody can live. Really? So they could be they could be those. They could be like to the rest of the world. Which would be like that would be amazing like history lifter. Yeah. We'll speaking of this. Let's talk about how terrified we are. How scared are we of the Chinese world order? Well, you know, he's he's like most extreme scenarios still has like the US basically sunk shooting as like northern Europe now like sort of like outside of the ties of history, but like still doing relatively well maturely comfortable. So in a practical sense, I'm not so sure like how scary it would be for the world to be run by the Chinese. I really skit for us scary for a lot of people. For that state to have even to be even more empowered and have even more grandiose visions of its role in the world. And I expected it would also be bad for, you know, citizens of these sorts of like client states, and who have some relationship to Chinese power and can't even count on their own. You know, the sort of the integrity of citizenship to protect them. So, you know, I think that I think that there is a possibility that China becomes both the world's most powerful country, and like the world's poorest place to live which is kind of funny like we tend to think in the west at least we tend to think that liberalization goes along with prosperity. And is like, you know, another test case of that. Yeah. I mean, one thing we didn't really get into in this talk that I wish we had is that, you know, the US has never not been a nation or a state that didn't have sort of construct itself along racial lines. But it still has this kind of fantasy of being a non racial. It's a, you know, it's a it's a constitutional state that's about membership, and and citizenship and belief. It's not it's not ethnic. And I know that the the in China has a more complicated relation to that. And the relationship between the. Ethnic minorities in China. And the the Han majority is fraught in ways that are different. And maybe I don't know are are more difficult to sort of like see forward. I mean, I'm sort of. I'm waiting out of my depth here or into the depend. Context we have this like this just absolutely horrific racial past. But you can't if you look at it squarely, you can't see it as anything, but like a model about the nation, right? Whereas in in the, you know, take slavery out of the equation. And it's just like a kind of status hierarchy that operates alongside class and nationality thousand other status hierarchies that are competing in the modern world. And you know, it becomes a lot harder to be offended by those by those like slights, and like relative relations, even if there's like a concentration camp with two million liters, and it seems like there is which is really horrible. You don't you can't really imagine like a national reckoning with that issue. And even if America's reckoning has been, you know, partial at best and slow and reluctant like, you know, they still peach about the slave trade in elementary school. And like, you kinda can't imagine Chinese kids about the weaker concentration camps. No. And the plus the idea, you know, going back as far as the Monroe doctrine. The idea has always been the US the empire. The, you know, the this is there's actually something sort of you could see why why the the the insistence on a particular kind of international politics sort of works for the US because you can sort of pretend that that the US empires actually about liberating people, and you sort of come up with this great beautiful story about how you know, the US just spreading freedom is the birthplace of freedom and democracy. And it's not spreading it everywhere else and an imperial power. That is based that is like sort of strictly that that you know, that has a an enormous core of a of a of a huge ethnic population. That is envisioning itself, as you know, generously bestowing upon other nations, you know, these infrastructure projects, and so on is one that is going to have its own like very real problems with you know, the. Same problems that every colonial imperial power has ever sort of faced. And you know, so like, I I suppose we're still talking about terror here. So I I agree with you. And I think that like the the terror really depends on where you are. And what your what your nation or what your community is offering to China, and how it's offering it, you know, in all honesty, like, I think it's probably in in. I think there's there's there's many different ways it's plays out. But if you can have a kind of stable, bipolar multipolar global community, it might actually be better for the world that the US has in in very obvious. And now extremely well-documented ways not been universally positive force in in global affairs and put it put it mildly and one in which, you know, no matter how how bad we we know China has China's state has acted that one in which there are multiple competing or or cooperating global superpowers is one in which you know, maybe. The poor people are less bad off that third world countries are developing countries are less bad off. You know, I think that there's like their if social change is going to accompany the belt and road initiative in evolves. A transfer of wealth from say Renteria class capitalists to the global poor that seems like basically in unequivocally good thing, but you know. It's they're like imposing, you know, it's like, they're imposing debt structure on countries that are like, you know. And I don't know. I mean, I I'm sure that like those highways are going to be good. But I also feel like does people are going to be like. No, you're right. That's true. I mean, like, I this is this is also sort of I well, let me put it the the one the one last thing that I should that. I that I was noting in this conversation that I kept thinking about is that, you know, the the technological changes is coming like whether or not we kind of like it. It seems at this point more or less inevitable that that that the way that the devices we use the internet that we're on is going to shape the twentieth century, national global, politics and the country that is able and willing to sort of use it in a concerted and coherent way is one that's going to be really well positioned to dominate. And so that speaks is sort of likely that like the fact that China embraces the future in this way. I think is something that that the US is going to have a lot of trouble figuring how to compete with. But what really scares me, the biggest the terrifying is that I'm not sure that the technology that is already kind of developed in being developed and. And the technology that is going to shape and dominate the world over the next hundred years to engineers is technology that that that that a state that masters that technology is a is a surveillance state. It's as state that is that is focused on using that tack to sort of like dominate its people. And so you know, that that that's a to me, that's a way all this stuff is tied into gather. And that I the one thing that does scare me is even if the US becomes sort of peripheral to global order, and even if you know, the the we're still pretty well off, and we still make pretty good movies. And like, you know, they're celebrities that we own that. I mean, this is. I was just I was just in Norway. And I kept looking at these Norwegian tabloids. And I was like, oh, there are Norwegian celebrities people that they that they carry this. The most important thing that we retain arts of some some level of, you know, at home celebrity, but the point is that, you know, we might sort of lose or or have we might still have all those things. But if our government says looking at China and saying like, this kind of mass surveillance mass, facial recognition technology. You know, is is what's necessary to have an edge that that that has considerably bad knock on affects to us. Now, it doesn't even have to be trying. They could look at you know, London could look at England and say, oh, actually having surveillance cameras on every street corner is a good thing. And I know that there are plenty of people in the US who don't mind that. But I'm a little wary of the idea that China could edge the US on technology in that way. And but edge it in a way that I am deeply uncomfortable with. This was a really fascinating conversation. Thank you to Bruno messiahs for joining us from Beijing. If you are interested in reading more from Bruno messiahs, his book, dawn of Eurasia on the trail of the new world order is out already and coming soon is belt and road the scene use of Chinese power. To hear more predictions from us subscribe to twenty thirty eight and check us out at NY MAG dot com forward slash two zero three eight this podcast was produced by Aniko in association with New York magazine, editor is David Haskell and editor in chief is Adama's. I'm max read. That's David Wallace wells in the future.

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