My People, Our History


This is is. One. The Tel Aviv review. Hello and welcome to the Tel Aviv review brought to you by Van, Leer, Jerusalem, Institute, I get on happened. Shenlin every week. We bring you conversations with authors about the books and research and other things that we like. If you like us, please consider becoming a patriot saporta going to homepage. That's toby. One FM FAM- slash Tel Aviv review, scroll down to the bottom and click the big red button says Patriots Click and support us. We're counting on you. This episode is part of a series generously sponsored by the Israeli Office of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation which includes a focus on global affairs and the international world. Order and we're pleased to welcome back to the show. Professor Rasheed holiday, speaking to us from New York City. You may have noticed that we have gone remote in these days of Corona. We want to tell you where guests are from rushing holidays. The Edwards Sade professor of Modern Arab Studies at Columbia University. He has a BA from Yale. From Oxford, he is co editor of the Journal of Palestine Studies and he was the president of the Middle East Studies. Association, he was also an advisor to the Palestinian delegation to the Madrid in Washington Arab Israeli peace negotiations from Tobin Ninety one until June nineteen ninety-three, and for our purposes most importantly, he's the author of seven books prior to the latest one which we will be discussing today. It's called the Hundred Years War. On Palestine. History of settler, colonialism and resistance now seventeen to twenty, seventeen published by metropolitan. Books in two. Thousand Twenty Rasheed Holiday. Welcome back to the Tel Aviv review. Thanks for having me back. So I. Want to open up by talking about the form or format of this book. You are writing this book as a historian, but not only. You've woven in a memoir. Making this rather personal, it's not just somebody's history or even. The People's history is also your personal history. Why did you decide to develop the book in this way? Were you trying to in some way? Challenge the historian of the conflict as well as historical ideas. Well I. I was I was under the influence of of my son in particular. Who said to me that? He thought I had written enough. Academic. Dry monographs and that it was time to write something a little more personal. And to bring in some of my own experiences, some of the stuff that I would use a sources, but in a different way including family material and so I. Reluctantly and with difficulty, acceded to this suggestion which he helped helped me to devise instructor for the book. and. I was trying to challenge a certain kind of historiographer. at at the same time and I don't know if that that succeeds because I'm making an argument that many historians don't find terribly controversial, but that many other people probably will, and at the same time I'm trying to make this a a narrative, this approachable and relatable for people who are not may be academics or specialists or historians. What is the thing you think? Historians do not find controversial, but the general reader might. Well, I mean in the in the very title is this. Is this This argument at this is a this is a struggle involves colonialism. This would not have been something that would have been controversial to anybody in the issue of in the Nineteen Twenty S or nineteen thirties. They understood that this was the same time that they saw it. As a national project that it was a colonial project, the word colonial was was commonly used as a self-described description but it's something that in the wake of the establishment of Israel in Post Network era is diminished actually. Actually in the Post World War Two era is banished from people's consciousness, and is now seen as almost an insult or a or a or a slur, to suggest that this is not just a national renewal project, or however Zionism wants to self described, but rather was an is a settler colonial project. Isn't it more a question of semantics than actual historiographer? Because you know, it's the evolution of the sociopolitical context of colonialism. After, decolonisation et CETERA. It's not so much the the facts themselves, but you interpret them. Well I think that the the point that I try and make here is that this is a common process for successful set or colonial. A project, which is to say that they normalize, they become national of the United States is set Nicole. New Project I'm sitting here. Looking on an island called Manhattan looking out my window and an island that was called Manhattan that's not an anglo-saxon. The that's that's a native American name. This is or colonial project. It's a successful. There is an American national entity that was created by. There's an Israeli national entity that was created by the Zionist project. There's nothing in that I eat. There's nothing contradictory between the idea that several co project should become a successful national project. How many of those are there these days? I'm trying to think after decolonisation. How many countries can you look around the world and say this country is the product of colonialism and is still governed or or inhabited primarily by the colonists, mainly white Anglo Saxon settler colonies, a New Zealand Australia United States and Canada You could argue that one of the rare cases where a settler colonial project was fundamentally revised would be South Africa maybe some east African countries. which were original, originally meant to be whites or colony colonies have developed in a different fashion, but those are the only ones I argue in the book designs. is unique and the struggle between Zionist project and the. Palestinians is unique in many other different ways. I mean for one thing. You don't have a Bible in South Africa or North America well. Let's go back many other. Reasons for the differences on you don't have a people. That's a direct extension of the Metropole. The way you do in France or in North America. British subjects come to North America French. North Africa and they see those colonies as extensions of the mother country. the the settlers who come to Palestine are trying to set up something completely separate from any. They have no other country as it were so it's unique in many many respects. Hope talk about some of the ways in which the unique and I want to go back to what you said in the beginning, which is that in the early years of Zionist project that would not have been a controversial thing to say, and I notice that in the introduction you sight Zev Jabotinsky from Nineteen twenty-three, referring to the Palestinian Arabs as trying to resist colonization in. In his words, and so the question is. Do you think that by that? He meant it in the way we mean today, which is in a negative pejorative sense like what a terrible thing this is colonialism, and of course they're trying to resist it or he have said yes. We're colonial project because we are desperate for a state, and that's the way states are built. Either that or territorial conquest, and we can't do territorial conquest. So this is what we're going to do. No he would have said just what you said he did. Say it. Isn't it great and become a spokesperson for dividends key? The other thing about Jabotinsky and his brutal honesty was an I. Mean you? You can find multiple multiple statements to this effect. Is it. Is it first of all as as you suggested he said. We have no alternative. We have to do this. We need an iron wall. provided by somebody else to enable us to establish this this colonial endeavor, but that. Of course this is our country belongs to us and we. We have no alternative. The other point to make about Jefferson skiing people in the twenties and thirties is this was the high age of European colonialism European colonialism was still extending in the post. World War One era after reside the the colonial powers extended their their their grip over the world. Questionable right. So much settler colonialism colonialism, buying large is an earlier phenomenon, is it? That's correct. That is correct inside China zone is the last gasp up white European settlers colonialist and Tony Judge, said it sort of missed the bus. It comes later. than all the ones that were much more successful in much earlier I mean they start here in the seventeenth century. North there. they started Australia in the eighteenth century in Palestine late nineteenth, so it is, it is in that respect in anomaly, but as late as the twenties and thirties, colonialism was still not in bad older. It was only. Really after World War Two in the era of decolonization that the world changed and Zionism changed its tune partly because they're doing this conflict with the British starting with the nineteen thirty nine White Paper until that point Zionism was, the cuddled Stepchild at British Columbia's However, much they they cobbled and complained about the British, not doing enough without British support. Support designers could not have established itself in Palestine in the twenties and thirties right up to nineteen thirty nine, and at that point, the conflict with the British lead Zionist to see themselves as fighting colonialism, and so it worked perfectly for them in in the era of decolonization, they could say we are fighting British colonials. It was a wonderful transformation for now. The interesting thing about the way you tell the historical narrative in your book divided into chapters each. Is called The a declaration of war from different. Yeah, and you can look at at least two declarations and wars and victories that were phenomenal from an Israeli point-of-view. That's the establishment of Israel in nineteen, forty, eight with the expulsion of a great chunk of the. Palestinian indigenous indigenous population. And, nine, hundred, sixty seven, that was also the Six Day War of course a remarkable victory why one these remarkable victories decisive enough to say okay to deliver a death blow? To the Palestinians. Actually a really good question, and I think that most people for a long time after nineteen forty eight would've assumed that the that victory did exactly what you said that it had finished Palestine. Meyer says sixty nine. There is no Palestine there never was she is. Sharing a common assumption we've won. They're gone. It's over among many Israelis. They were dealing with the Arab countries They thought that was the only conflict they had to really. Resolve in their favor that the one with the Palestinians had been settled in forty eight at they were wrong. Turns out because the housing. National Movement revives in the nineteen late fifties and sixties I touch on that in the book and many historians have talked about it starting with Yoshua porath way back when and and many others since. Israeli Palestinian another sixty seven actually ironically gives a boost the Palestinian nationalist even as it is enormous quote, unquote victory for Israel It also is victory for Palestinian nationalism. again. This is irony, but there we are. A quota because it was so succinct, you said a central paradox of nineteen, sixty seven by defeating the Arabs Israel resurrected the Palestinians. That's a very powerful statement. How did that actually happen? Well many people in the Arab world assumed the negative outcomes of ninety forty eight would somehow be A. Changed positively a by the Arab governments, so whether the nothing in Egypt, the bathroom in Syria or whoever that this would this this? These problems would be redressed. In the the minds of some people that would mean the destruction of Israel in the minds of some people that would be. A return to the forty-seven frontiers, whatever it might me and the Palestinians were sort of. Not the ones who are seen as having their destiny in their on had this is Palestinian assertion that was going on at the time, the development of the redevelopment of a revived Palestinian. National Movement that Said No. We have to do it ourselves, but most Arabs most people in the Arab world in the Middle East felt the our governments were responsible, and the governance were shown to be weakened incompetent. By the results of the nineteen sixty seven war. Where three, Arab armies were decisively defeated in just a couple of a few days by the Israeli by. He's really military. So, I think to understand the roots of that revival. Now now we now that we're at sixty seven. I WANNA go back to the early part of the twentieth century when you chronicle through parts of your own family, the emergence of a Palestinian national identity, the one that has been so roundly denied by Israeli leaders and their supporters over the years and I I wonder if you could tell us a bit about how how how Palestinian Arabs at the time saw the emergence of that national identity? Why do you say that contradicts Zionist narratives so decisively? Well. I mean this is the topic of written on a couple of in a couple of places. Where here looks right and it? It's based on understanding of nationalism that is not well regarded by nationalists, whether whether Israeli while designers or whether Palestinian or for that matter Arab nationalist or any other national because my understanding of nationalism is that it's very modern phenomenon. My understanding is that even though it. It incorporates pre existing elements of identity religion ORB attachment to place, or whatever language It is an ENU phenomenon. The idea that the policy has to be made up of people who are similar nationally have the same language, and so on so forth. That's a modern concept didn't exist in the seventy sixteenth century the British. Don't bring a a German and put him on the throne because he's. A national. They bring in and it doesn't matter that he's a German and before that they Dutchman. Sixty eight so the national principal, even in the most developed. Later on developed nations is not fully established until much much later than most people assume. And, that's true with Palestine the idea that you are a Palestinian above being more Jerusalem lighter. A member of that family simply didn't exist in seventeen, hundred or eighteen, hundred or even probably into the late nineteenth century And that's true for Zionism as well as minority ideology in the nineteenth century late nineteenth century when it develops. Most Jews don't think that they belong to a nation state that has to be established. In their ancestral homeland of the land of Israel that's a new concept in the late nineteenth century. And not it's not a majority. so I trace in different works I've done a how passing national consciousness develops and the elements out of which the medical overlapping identities out of which develops and it really doesn't take off until the twentieth century at any more than Zionism for that matter I mean you have four million Jews coming to the United States, and tens of thousands coming to Palestine and the people voted with their feet. The ones who believed in Zionism. Sincerely came to Valentine ones. Who didn't. I stayed in Russia or stayed in eastern Europe or came to the United. States and I would argue that over time that changes. And that those beliefs constitute realities, national reality is a real saying but the ideas that people hold as members of the quote, unquote nation or very often miss fabrications, distortions and so on. The interesting thing about looking at it from Settler colonial perspective. Is that it allows us to go beyond the actual existence or non existence of the Nazi. The national consciousness and look at. Politics in terms of you know power political power and the Jews designers you know, however downtrodden and poor and persecuted. They were. Still enjoyed stress. Sudden degree, the support off of. You know international powers that allow them to develop this disparity of power. with the Palestinians is not really the thing that you know. Put the conflict in motion in your in your view. Absolutely this is why I describe what happens in nineteen, seventeen with the Balfour Declaration as a declaration of war on the Palestinians. Hertzel Hawks Zionist project all around Europe. He went to the Ottoman Sultani went to the German Kaiser. Frenchie was unsuccessful. But it was only when vitamin managed to. Win The support of the British during a one that the project really takes off I. Mean You have settlers and you? Have you have settlements colonies in Palestine before the Balfour Declaration, but until you have a great power setting this at the center of its Middle East Policy. And putting troops and money and power of behind it that this becomes the this project takes all. So. Yes, absolutely, and this comes to crunch in the late thirties when the Palestinians finally rise up. And in thirty, six, thirty, nine in the British bring in. Over one hundred thousand soldiers in the Royal Airforce. They crushed Austin without that. That Israel would not have been created. There's just no. There's no question that the support of the greatest power of the age in those two decades after World War, one was essential of the precondition central precondition for the establishment of the state of Israel. This is not an entirely controversial argument. Tom Segev makes the same argument in his book one Palestine complete. Right but I think that what I what goes seems to me another underlying theme of the book. Even if I'm not sure if you intended for it to be, but it seems to me that it stands out which is that the Palestinian Arabs of the time in the attempt to kind of consolidate and assert their national identity faced a struggle at every angle in other words, it was obvious that Zionists would try to deny that there their national identity, but the British as you say, make war on them, and then later on, you also document how the Arab states were not too keen to recognize their national identity specifically king. King Abdullah of Jordan, who extended his generous offer to to put them under his protection after forty eight. They said no, you your your family. Members were intimately involved in that, and and it was like an assertion of Palestinian leadership that we need to forge her own identity. That was not particularly welcome. Why why was that such a struggle? When other nations were coming into being through the first half of the late nineteenth century and first half of the twentieth century, and being recognized as such wide of the Palestinians constantly have to make the case that we are a nation unto ourselves, not just one of the Arab world. Well, it's. It's a combination of factors. One is the consistent support of external powers. What we've already talked about not just the British during World War Two the world changes in a great powers become the great superpowers become the United States and the Soviet Union was I honest. Movement to its credit cultivates its links with both such that when push comes to shove in the post, World War Two. It has the support of both superpowers. Partition doesn't pass without the Americans the Russians. Arming it through the General Assembly forcing a client states we countries to vote for it Israel doesn't get established without both military support, diplomatic support, and so on from both superpower. So there's that continues, but as you as you suggest there's also other problems for the Palestinians one of them being of the lack of support from the Arab countries in in many cases, the active opposition of the countries notably as you mentioned king on the. Abdallah, was always hostile to Palestinian nationalism because his ambitions included expanding his. Don't mean westwards into Palestine North into Syria. And if possible eastwards into Iran, he always felt that he got the short end of the stick. When Winston Churchill distributed the goodies after World War One and he wanted as much as he could get a Palestine. He was the only are who welcomes nineteen thirty seven partition plan a private Auckland. Commission of seven the. Appeal Commission Partition Plan of Nineteen, thirty seven. He was perfectly happy with the nine hundred forty seven partition plan a recount, an incident that my father told me about in nineteen, forty, seven A. At the very moment when the partition plan was was adopted by the General Assembly. And he cut a deal tried to cut a deal with Zionist movement with the Jewish Agency in the person of moisture, Sharon, and go the Meyer with whom he negotiated a great lakes. How they would sort things out in Palestine, so he was fundamentally opposed to Palestinian nationalism because of his own territorial ambitions. The problem with other countries was that sometimes they actually oppose the president. So Palestinians fought the Syrians for example in the seventies Libyan and Iraqi intelligence services killed many many many Palestinian leaders of, but the other problem was their rivalries of nullified any possibility of their of their extending unified support to the Palestinians or doing anything. vis-a-vis Israel so I didn't directly. So it's either they directly fought against the Palestinians or because they were fighting against each other. The Palestinians became the pawn. Exactly right and that's and that's again. Another spurred Palestinian nationals, and that's one reason that in the in the wake of sixty seven, the Palestinian National Movement takes off, takes over the PLO which had been established by Egypt to master and control of rising policy nationals in the Palestinians taken over and as they say, the rest is history. was there anything that the Palestinians could have done to improve diplomatic standing maybe not as much as the the Zionist who really has excelled at it, but do you think that the Palestinians were perhaps a bit too passive times passive way. I I want to sharpen that question I. Wanna I wanNA pile on to that question. It seems like as the Palestinian leadership was emerging, and and again forming itself in the in the fifties and sixties, they generally used military strategies whether it was raids inside Israel, or as you put it I, think later commando groups in the lead up to sixty seven, so maybe if you can put the two halves of our question together and say did the strategy. They meant they chose work. Or Church could they have done more on the diplomatic international seen and done would there with the results have been different or better I know the counterfactual, but we'll just a little schools. Well I mean I. I think that the outcome was over determined as you're going up against the great power, the age for. The better part of a century. It's very unusual that you're gonNA win. No colonized people a won its independence between will one were to accept the Irish in the entire colonized world. Nobody wants except the Irish, so you know you would have had have been exceptionally a gifted as a national movement to defeat colonials in the war period, and as I say only the Irish did so in nineteen, twenty two, as far as it could have done things differently. Of course, they could have done things differently. The reasons why they didn't are laid out in the book, but there were many moments when better choices could have been made when better strategies could have been adopted and should have been adopted. Details. Sales are just a couple of examples sure for example in the in the Middle East in the Inter war period. No, no, no country. Freed itself that was under external rule as were most. With the exception of Saudi Arabia and Yemen, all of none of the free themselves coin role, but the ones that revolted right after World War One the Iraqis and the Egyptians in particular got some form of independence forced the British to give them something. The Palestinians didn't rise until they thirty six big big mistake there they should have active much much earlier, and they might have gotten a change in these include extremely unfavorable circumstances imposed on them by the mandate for Palestine. I can give you other examples. Of they should have rejected the nineteen thirty nine white paper, a Britain was declining force in nineteen thirty nine, but still it would have put them in a different position in most of the Palestinian. Leadership was in favor of except that it was only the most. A sitting in exile in Beirut at the time who who opposed accepting the white paper, so there are many other examples could give what about after the war, though after the establishment of Israel do we had the same question in? Yeah then you come to the question of of Diplomatic the question that you asked at the end of diplomacy versus force it's a brutal reality that had the Palestinians not resorted to force they probably within the force themselves on the attention of the world. The policies of hijackings, the policies of a terrorist attacks you can call them whatever you want. Commando operations terrorist attack, using your language on civilians or on on military targets, which were militarily and strategically complete, completely unsuccessful succeeded in putting the Palestinians back as as it were on the map. Unfortunately, it also helps to picture them his terrorists, but that then was turned. A by the PLO into the springboard for a diplomatic offensive that was actually quite successful in the sixty seventies and eighties The the Palestinians became. A recognized actor on the world stage after decades in which Israel, the United States and others at assume they had been Owen there was no Palestine. There were no Palestinians there was a refugee issue of the the the resolution adopted after the nineteen sixty seven war doesn't mention the Palestine question or Palestine the Palestine's. Just resolution of the refugee problem. which refugees are they do? They have ended entity to. They have political demands not mentioned. It's a refugee problem. It's a humanitarian issue. That's the status of the Palestinians. In nineteen, sixty seven international Soviet Union voted for that resolution. Britain France United States. China voted that resolution so getting themselves to where they are recognized by over one hundred, whatever it is countries that they their leader addresses, the General Assembly nineteen seventy four is extraordinary change from the situation between nineteen, forty, eight and nineteen sixty seven, so that was a diplomatic strategy that I argue in the book was actually quite successful. And regardless of diplomatic strategies, there was you know maybe an unwitting one which was there's ideas de Dare I say a intifadas that actually changed the perception of the Palestinians, among public opinion in the West, but not so much thanks to diplomatic efforts on. Either shape, but because that's the way it was. It was really a watershed or I do the first Intifada was the second? Intifada was a disaster for the Pasta. I described the first intifada, the one that started in nineteen, seventy, eighty, seven, as one of the few Palestinian successes, because as you say, it accurately portrayed the conflict as one not between an Arab goliath in poor, tiny, innocent, little Israel under siege, but Much more correctly as the Palestinians alone in the field, unarmed against this colossus, which is the Israeli occupation so a little boy, throwing stone against the tank is an image which doesn't exactly something's up, but a lot a hell of a lot better. Than the way in which the conflict had been portrayed by Zionist propaganda over over generations, which is tiny, tiny little. Israel all the arbs destroy it by this stage by the time the Intifada has come about. Egypt is at peace with Israel. Jordan has been collaborating with Israel since before Israel's established. A most Arab countries are busy with their problems. Israel's faces no actual existential threat from the region and is beating up on the Palestinians and so. The the media image that emerges from the first intifada in my view is an enormous victory for the Palestinians and whether able to talk. But but you're also right. It's not something that's. It's premeditated or a result of strategy. It's a result of spontaneous uprise. Do you think that the Palestinian leadership capitalized on it in in a way that said well it seems like at the moment of the Antifa it led to the Palestinian leadership, or I should say the P. L. O. leadership at that time. What was the tunas leadership to change their attitude, or at least their public facing demands for Palestinians determination and formalize? Formalize the demand for a Palestinian state in the West Bank in Gaza, as opposed to all the other phases that you document in which I as was establishing an all Palestinian state at Palestinian Arab state, and then after that one democratic state, and this was sort of an evolution. Do you think that the intifada kind of galvanized or or somehow catalyzed that? Change of national self determination goal, and also more importantly in a allow the Palestinian leadership to speak openly about engaging with Israeli government. Yeah. I think that all all of what's implied in the question is essentially correct, which is to say that the Palestinians are tossing leadership is able. The L. Leadership is able to come out as it were a with their true intentions much more. After the Intifada end in one, thousand, nine hundred eighty declaration of independence is proof of what you're saying. However, anybody who white looked closely at the actual evolution of what was going on inside Palestinian politics as distinct from the entirely false vision of it. It's portrayed by Israeli government apologised, which is the bow are bloodthirsty terrorists who wanted to destroy us? They have no objective other than that anybody who looks at reality rather than this. This false construct will see that that's an evolution that ends as you as you say in nineteen eighty eight, but which really begins in the immediate aftermath of the seventy three war with the Palestine National, council taking a series of resolutions, starting in seventy, four, which adapts to accept the idea of a two-state solution, so they were, they were already going in that direction, the intifada that gives them as the platform as it were. To come out much more openly for. A diplomatic of the conflict. In fact, we know that they're begging to get into the diplomatic game much much before. This is early as the as early as the mid Seventies. Right, you document that I. Just think it's interesting that I mean I, want to challenge you a little bit because in the book you know you described to two particular, in addition to other events that were parts of the war on Palestine and I'm referring specifically to four to to UN Security Council resolution to fourteen and the Oslo process, both of which were considered wars on Palestine in your in. In your reading, but which today are considered the cornerstone of of of the legitimization for what many in the at least in the Israeli camp, considered the road to peace, which is a two state solution. So why are those wars on Palestine? If they could have actually advanced the idea of a two-state solution eventually, even if they didn't say so specifically at the time. Well two four two dozen to what you're saying to to does not set out the basis for a two state solution. No does the formula land for peace negotiations. But it lands egos in between Israel and Arab states, and there are the only actors that are envisaged into a and B. Given the escape clause. It's written into it. The territories occupied This is territory without the word that's not exactly territories occupied in the English version of of the resolution, which is the definitive once far as the only power that matters, which is the united. States is concerned. Israel enabled to keep the occupied territories for fifty three years in county, so it is not a basis for a two four two is not a resolution on the basis on which adjust and lasting peace, involving return of territories, occupied and sixty seven could have been made in wasn't meant to be. It was crafted. Enclosed in close coordination between the United States and Israeli diplomats. To give Israel all the leeway to extract whatever it wanted from the Arab states, while not necessarily giving back in fact in in the case of Palestinian territories, not giving back the tar trees there occupying sixty-seven, whether to Jordan or anybody else I mean we have since I. Don't talk about this in the book, but we have scenes from the Israeli side in multiple revelations of how often the Israelis stonewalled Jordan when it tried to starting right after sixty seven and going on for well over a decade ago when it tried to negotiate the return of the of the Jordanian control, the previously Jordanian controlled territories that were occupied sixty. Sixty seven so two four two is not that the Oslo process had that potential or might have had. I wouldn't say the also processes. The Madrid process might have had that potential, but again as I write in the book as I suggest in the book and another book I wrote specifically about Madrid, also there are various hidden time bombs written into the letter of invitation of the letters of the Sheri- is given to the various parties and the ground rules which in effect meant that you could not have a Palestinian state or rather Israel could prevent the establishment of the Palestinian state with the full approval of the United States. Okay, so how do we start to tie this all together? We've exposed the miss we've you know tried to expose the war. You've tried to expose the war. What you consider a war against Palestine. And what do you think the Palestinian National Movement should do now? You point out a few directions in the conclusion. One of them I think is particularly interesting. which is you you argue for the effectiveness of making the parallels between the Palestinian situation and other conflicts or colonial conflicts or other kinds of conflicts in the world. How do you think that we take the information that you've been examining and leverage it to point out the way forward? Well. You know. I'm a historian. I'M NOT A. Politician. I'm nine I'm focal strategists so I get to ask questions that no, no, of course, it's appropriately. It's a perfectly legitimate question, but I I don't think that I have the you know the answer to the political question. If I did you know I would be a politician. Probably fail like most politicians, but I think that I think it would I try and lay out. Here is the arguments that should be made i. think the arguing how many states condense on the head of a pen is futile. We have a one st reality created by Israel carefully crafted by Israel over fifty three years, starting with the first decisions made after the occupation is made. By Labor governments and continuing especially with a special a vengeance and power, but with the government dominated by the good from seventy seven. And that's a reality that could be changed backwards. What Tony Judd One said what any politician has done. Another politician can undo is of course true. You could. rewind extract of a of six hundred seven hundred thousand settlers from the occupied territories. You, could you know take apart the Matrix of control, but I don't think that's likely to happen I. Think we have a one st reality and the question is what kind of state is GonNa be? Is it going to be the kind of discriminatory? Repressive a state dominated by what is probably now minority of the total population of Palestine between the river in the. Is it going to be a different politics? How you get to to where you don't have discrimination in where whether you're born in New York, or Amana? Whatever you, you want to be a citizen of this thing, you can come there and not only this group can go, and not that good can how you get it I don't know I. Really Don't know I had no idea but I think that's I think that the arguments that I lay out. Against the. Status Quo, our arguments at least should be considered by anybody WHO's want is engaged in trying to change that sets fusing that the misconception about all those issues in public opinion in the West is really what prevents things from moving forward, and perhaps with your book, your endeavouring in a way to try and change that I think we'll trying to say. Is there a polemical aspect to your book? No, no, no, no! Let me answer. I sincerely believe. That inspite of the national reality that Zionism is created in spite of the independent separate existence of an Israeli nation state. that. The project was an is. Always was and still is dependent on external support Israel doesn't do what it does. Without external support, it doesn't operate as it operates without the incredible economic exchange with the EU without the incredible, technological, military and especially financial support from the private sector in this country, not just from the US government that it that it enjoys. Changing that external situation for Israel changes that balance. The Palestinians of course as I argue. In the book very very forcefully have to get their act together. It's not just a matter of changing the situation abroad in Europe in the United States it's not just a matter of changing opinion inside Israel or changing the it, you have to change the balance of forces between the Palestinians and Israel, which is entirely or largely in Israel's favor right now. It has been for a very long time and to do that. The Palestinians have to. Reform reestablish regenerate their national movement, which is in a parlous terrible state, right? And have to clarify their strategic objectives, which is which is something that is sorely lacking. Right now. And they also have to go back to some of the strategies that served in in the past, which is appealing to people around the world, and also appealing to Israelis, which they utterly failed to do in the current circumstance, which doesn't mean quote, unquote normalization. What it means is making a case for Palestine to Israelis. The Israelis can understand in Hebrew. The people who are closest to being able to do that or Palestinians inside Israel. Palestinian citizens of the state of Israel they're the ones who understand Zionism better than anybody. They all speak Hebrew. They grew up in their Israelis sunk. Some of them are more Israeli than other Israelis. But that whether was air, leadership, or through an evolution of consciousness of that's going to have to happen among the Palestinians so they can be the braves. The Palestinian citizens of Israel can be the bridge the bridge they they already are. They already are I mean everything we know much of what we know we've learned from either poets from inside Israel or or literary figures politics I. Mean The the the role that they've already played in in in. Expanding Palestinian understanding of Israel and Zionism is enormous. And they'll do much more than in the future whether legally or in terms of their involvement in Isreaeli politics or whatever but but I go back to the core of the question. I sincerely believe that Israel is in some fundamental ways dependent on the liberal democracies in the West. End of Israel is increasingly illiberal. And increasingly a and has increasingly moved towards a kind of discrimination that is fundamentally unacceptable to liberal democracies. Now there are countries in the west of the cease to be liberal democracies. Poland and Austria and Hungary are moving rapidly away from liberal democracy. Trump does not represent a liberal democratic trend in the United States, quite the contrary. Those trends may may rise in the future if they do in Israel is in a great position. It already has wonderful relations with the most autocratic countries on earth, Russia China and increasingly illiberal democracy in. India don't forget I could go on and on I. Mean All of the countries I mentioned Israel has excellent relations with. All of Eastern European countries that are moving to the right but. Ultimately it is dependent on on Western. Europe in the United States in some ways some fundamental ways. If opinion as and when opinion changes here, and it is changing in the United States there is absolutely no question that is changing in the Jewish community among young people among minorities among the base of the Democratic Party even among the ossified. Long standing supporters of Israel who control in lead the Democratic Party and fund the Democrat. Party even among those people. There are changes, even they the polls. as those as as those evolutions, take place in spite of the push back the money in the power that's inserted into trying to turn Palestinian activism, anti-semitism, work or frame. It is by the incredible efforts in York to shut down any discussion of Palestine in spite of that there is there is fundamental change going on, and it hasn't when that happens. Israel is going to have a real problem. The IT doesn't change. The it doesn't solve the problem, but it's GonNa. It's GonNa. Be a very important factor. Well, change is on its way. Somehow we don't know what form it will take, but in the meantime I wanNA. Thank you. That's a professor Rasheed highly who's been speaking to us from New York. Thank you for being on the show again. Thanks for having me energy big thanks to shell them in Georgia Foscarini our producers once again to the Israel Office of the Konrad, Adenauer Foundation for sponsoring the series, no request, many or most of you listen to us on the apple podcasts. APP and we'd like to ask you to please consider writing us a review. We like good ones. Bad ones annoyed ones. You can also support us by going to our website. T L V ONE DOT FM slash Tel Aviv. Review and subscribing are Patriot campaign. Check out our archive. We have over five hundred interviews like us on facebook. Follow Me Gilaad on twitter and join us again next week for another edition of the Tel Aviv review, and until then good bye.

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