Mister Pearson discussed on Overnight re-air of day's programming

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Are we have in in engaged Mister Pearson and we are looking into these issues miss rewards may have more more details on this but we take concerns wherever they come from seriously and we have a process for dealing with that with for interviewing in investigating concerns that are are raised by individuals and things that we observed during our own oversight I don't mean to be difficult but I just think to look into it this is the man off I I wanna make I want a commitment from you that we're going to investigate these concerns for this we are doing that in that have my commitment we are doing that thank you I don't have any further comments thank the gentleman representatives final thank you Mister chairman to want to express my condolences to the members of the family here today with you and says guides peace and comfort in as you deal with this difficult tragedy your lives Florida Republican representative ras panel I had an opportunity you several months ago to have a meeting with the a colleague of mine friend who's also a pilot and and flown the seven thirty seven Max and the time he and I I'm not a pilot just riding your planes it's much I know about them but when he expressed to me is there is there was a a periodic briefings that pilots are provided which the potentially provides is essentially a binder that that includes memos directives information that pilots should be aware of as it relates to to safety issues on the planes at their that that they're that they're piloting he told me that this particular issue with the M. caste system was in fact it to his recollection included within that that binder of of things to be aware of all right but that it was kind of buried the bottom of a of a of a stack of such memos okay is I guess my court my question and so from from his perspective is really seems from my perspective as a lay person that yeah of if if you're if you're gonna have a memo relating to an issue of such importance buried in a stack this big are you really providing any meaningful you know direction to the two pilots and so given given that kind of scenario it is that in fact the case can you comment on that appreciate that thank you well I believe thanks for the question the the I think it you know as deputy minister al well had said in his previous testimony it's my belief and I and he shares a that pilot should have known about the system on the airplane and should have been part of the initial training particularly as the design was changed so it would operate more the heart of the flight envelope with respect to information about unscheduled stabilizer trim in the emergency airworthiness directive as Mister Lawrence said earlier that is an extraordinary action I think the last one that the FAA had done was about two years earlier and and in twenty sixteen it is something that should be stamped on top of a rise for head out there so if if that's not reaching the level of prominence that it needs to in the operator committee with that's definitely something that we need to look at it and I would encourage you to do that because a take away that I got my conversation from him is that he was certainly aware of the issue but that the fact that you have such an important memo with regard to an issue of safety is essentially buried it is that that can't happen it seems to me that those there should be issues that should be number one in terms of prominence another question I had for you is that there if there was a question earlier I apologize but are you aware of allegations by a former FAA safety engineer that the FAA's management safety culture is broken and demoralizing to dedicated safety professionals and if you are how do you respond to that allegation well the I want to make sure again on my first day at the agency are emphasize that has this has to come from the top that we need to have a healthy state your reporting culture it's what we demand of those that we regulate I come from the airline business and and the ability to be able to systematically intake or uptake safety concerns is extremely important to the safe operation of an airline and I think it's it's equally important if not more so within the agency so we need to as people raise issues either through their chain of command through their boss or as whistleblowers there also needs to be this middle ground were were able to take in systematically safety concerns one of the things that we need to do a better job of is going back after decisions are made in communicating to the work force how how what all the considerations were and why decisions are being made because sometimes there's a there may be a perception that you sided with this person or that person or this company or you know chose to retain some of the age of the those that's not the right the right lands that we need to be looking at through these things also we want to have a system where we encourage healthy debate as we make decisions you're going to have with other pilots are engineers subject matter experts you want to have that healthy debate but ultimately somebody has to make the decision and in these cases that you're referring to the decision makers themselves are actually experienced technical experts as well thank you okay thank chairman of now representative Johnson thank you Mister chairman I'd ask that the tarom report that you displayed during you are questioning be placed back on the screen and Mister Dixon I'd like to direct your attention to it democratic a Georgia representative Hank Johnson in December of twenty eighteen about one month after the lion air flight six ten crash the FAA performed this risk assessment that calculated the likelihood of future seven thirty seven MAX crashes caused by the erroneous impasse activation is that correct yes Sir that's correct and this is the report that issued from that analysis correct yes Sir actually my previous answer I should elaborate this is looking at all the factors that that went into the action so not only am cash just the other kinds of factors but you would admit that the results show and an acceptable risk yes and that's why correct why the actions were taken in fact just a drastic unacceptable risk is it not yes or at what it's indicating to us is essentially over the life of over about a forty five year period that we would have an acceptable level of risk and so we need to take action to be able to reduce that risk to to to the level that we want so this is so it's definitely an important document that exists within the bowels of the FAA correct all right it is a decision support tool remember that before data like this one question is that this document exists in the bowels of the FAA correct it exists I wouldn't necessarily say with I think we're pretty aware of it at at the highest levels of the day now when did you first the highest levels of the FAA well let me put it like this who was it that took action on this report and when was the first action taken of the first one the first action was taken just about immediately I think is a correct real and so what was the date what and what was the action taken how would you describe how would you describe that so the first action that was taken Sir was the emergency AD even before these forms were completed Lawrence FAA so after this form was completed what was done okay because you said that it was a drastically unacceptable risk and it was this study was performed prior to be easier Ethiopian airlines a crash which my friends on the other side by the way you want to try to impugn that it was the Ethiopian airlines an African airline and their personnel who was somehow responsible for both of these crashes with this hearing is about the FAA certification process and I resent that but getting back to my point here what was done about this report when it was first received by the FAA so again it this is a tool used by our our our board by board that was the basis and the state yeah before this report was even completed it was recognized that we needed to do additional work okay well and what I'm getting to is what was done after this report was generated the for this report was generated the accident was generated after the report was generated is what I'm getting at there wasn't an additional action after this because the action prior to this even being completed was to redesign the system what this report guided the cut the board to look at was how much time would we allow bowing to redesign the system will let me let me ask this question in either one of you at mit to yourselves that the FAA made a mistake in not taking action on this term record of when it was first issued well I would say that this is something that we need to look at very closely and I mean was a mistake made I was in the the result is not satisfactory well shows can't bring yourself to say that we made a mistake and you weren't even there at the time I'm so absolutely this is a part of the process that needs to look at whether it's the data that goes into the decision the decision did not achieve the result that that it needed to achieve now is the fact that the FAA a overseeing Boeing with forty five personnel to fifteen hundred two Boeing does that indicate that perhaps there is a problem with staffing in the FAA's certification process so that we don't allow the fox to guard the hen house to the extent that it happened with the seven thirty seven magic it briefly answers questions time I think that that's something that we need to look at it's not just it's not numbers as much as it is the skill set within the workforce because of that that group that's overseeing the Boeing DA has the ability to draw resources from without the agency very summer the way that a certificate management officer receives an airline thank thank Jim represented Miller thank you Karen the fascio and to all of you who lost loved ones my heart goes out to you I hope you have been able to be surrounded by family and friends and your faith in love and the light that it will bring you it was a horror for you and my heart does go out to you I think this is a discussion and the questions that we've had today from both sides of the aisle indicates how we want to not ever have this happen again it is it is definitely a bipartisan issue because we are all human beings and we all want to be safe and we all I assume we all take airplanes somewhere at some time in our life and there are moments when you fly if you're not a pilot you kind of go over what was that and so moving forward it appears to me that we need more transparency and communication when it comes to creating an international aviation safety standard that does work for everyone it also appears that there are many areas that we need to work on the only way for us to come together to tackle safety is to understand that we need to take a multi faceted approach to the issue and I believe that's what you all are trying to do Mister Dixon can you elaborate on the joint authorities technical review and what exactly is included thank you and appreciate the question the opportunity to comment I agree with you one hundred percent that these issues need to be looked at from a an aviation system perspective and we're seeing a lot of growth in the system internationally and the the U. S. as of early stage is a is a stable which was a growing healthy system but it's pretty mature stable system and and what we do here you know we're we're selling airplanes around the world and you should be able to work everywhere and so the issues that we need to look at may very somewhat but but in terms of the Jetta report I think it's very important understand that the FAA commission that that that group itself but it's sort of like one piece of the pie and it doesn't offer the the complete perspective the perspective from the tab is another as perspective that will inform our future efforts we also have.

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