Vasili discussed on Epicenter



So you mentioned right that the misbehavior of the relay can be kind of detected by the rest of the network. This is also true for, I guess, node operators or the other parties and what would happen to them if let's say it would operator starts to not follow the convention or like build a block himself, will they be excluded from the relay or how would that work in practice? So really, this is designed in such a way that there isn't really a way for node operators to misbehave. The reason why you need this is because you want to be able to support solo stickers. To be able to support 100% of the network, you need to be able to support node operators, I completely untrusted. And so there isn't really a way for node operators to abuse and grief the system. What you can. Where the misbehavior sort of occurs or has the potential to occur is on the relay. So there's three specific ways in which a relay can misbehave with regards to their relationship with the node operators. They can lie about the payment that they are making. For the inclusion of this block, they can produce a block that's just invalid. It has a transaction in there that violates some consensus rules, and therefore the block just gets thrown out. Or it can withhold the block. So it can just not reveal the block to the network when it has to. So each of these different misbehaviors have specific mitigations, that mean that node operators can observe and identify when these take place. And then terminate the relationship with that relay. Maybe a question to vasili kind of on this now you kind of mentioned that the payment is received once a blog is revealed to the node operators. Now, if there were a lie to a policy kind of how would that go to the what that kind of accrue to the STE holders somehow can you kind of explain your thoughts on that? Yeah, we've got already an upgrade out, like light door is already for the merchant of the most things. We expect operators to set up the payment address as light address. The other accrued on this address will be staked in proportionally accrued those Tech Data holders. So it's a bit of a bump on APR for the whole stack that they hold us. So proportionally mean like the same kind of commission structure that applies to the main mistake rewards will also apply to the MeV. Yeah, same structure. So out of 100% of a meteor was like 90% goes to stake us and 5% do not operate us and 5% to wider. It has one fun side effect of automatically smooth in the immediate rewards. So in light operators, if you get the average, and if you reward per day, basically. And in proportion to how many nodes there on. So there is no outsized winners and losers in the only extraction lie that it's all smoothed out. And yeah, thanks, that's helpful. Maybe we can talk a little bit about the markets here, right? 'cause you mentioned a bunch of different parties, right? So we basically have the person making the transaction and there is like sort of the application, let's say, it will look through something similar. Then there is the relayer. The block builder, I guess, and then the validator, I guess, in this case, there's even light a doll as an additional party that like that's in there. But can you talk a little bit about, you know, what are the sort of market access and where do you see the economic value that derives from value and cost? That derives from MeV, where do you see that crew? And I guess flashbots is another party that's in there, right? Yeah, so we sort of see ourselves as the game designers here, right? Like our goal is to design a game that is incentive aligned with the interests of all the stakeholders in the system. And also a line with the objective of the chain that we're designing a game for. And what we sort of see as being a healthy game with regards to the supply chain is one in which the value accrues to the edges. So it accrues to the user whose trying to interact with the chain and to the stakers at the other end who are ultimately providing the capital and the security for the chain. So what a healthy supply chain looks like is a lot of competition at each intermediary step between the users and the staker, such that each role takes a minimum minimum fee, a minimal rent extraction. The market should be the one that sets exactly how that how big that value is. But in a competitive market it should trend towards zero, or as close as possible to it. So really that's how we see the utopic game evolving. Now, economic incentives are such that any actor in the system want to accrue outside rent for themselves. They want to monopolize and reduce the competition for their role to be able to increase the percentage of the economic benefit that they can capture themselves. And that is the key metric to look out for. How much of the value is being accrued to the edges, the users and stakers versus to intermediaries who are who are collecting month. Do you have any indication or how much that currently is or is there any kind of looking into that form on the MeV side and proof work? Or do you think it will improve with proof of stake and then MeV boost versus proof of work? Very difficult to quantify. So there's a few goals with flashbots. So first is the democratized access to MeV, prevented from becoming sort of these exclusive games. This also means maximize

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