Central Intelligence Agency, Philip Mudd, Director discussed on C-SPAN2 Book TV

Automatic TRANSCRIPT

You're from Philip might about his new book black site the CIA and the post nine eleven world I like to tell you about two upcoming programs taking place in this theater. it's Friday August sixteenth at noon William G. Hyland junior will tell us about a forgotten founding father George Mason the founding fathers who gave us the bill of rights not on Tuesday September tenth at noon Sidney Blumenthal will tell us about his recently released volume three of his biography of Abraham Lincoln all powers of earth the political life of Abraham Lincoln eighteen fifty six to eighteen sixty three. to find out more about these programs and our exhibits please visit our website at W. W. W. dot archive stocked up slash calendar you also find some printed materials out in the theater lobby about upcoming events as well as a sign up sheet so that you can receive an electronic version of a monthly calendar. Philip Mudd join the Central Intelligence Agency in nineteen eighty five as an analyst specializing in South Asia and then the Middle East after the September eleventh attacks he was a CI a member of the small diplomatic team that helped piece together a new government for Afghanistan. after returning to the CIA he became deputy director of the counterterrorism center and served there until two thousand and five. he was the first deputy director of the federal bureau of investigations national security branch and later became the F. B. I.'s senior intelligence adviser. what what is received numerous CIA awards and commendations and has commented about terrorism in congressional testimony and been featured in broadcast and print news. he is now the president of mud management a company specializing in security consulting analytic training and public speaking about security issues he is a senior fellow at the new America foundation and the George Washington university's homeland security policy institute and serves as senior global adviser to Oxford analytica a British based firm specializing in advising multinational companies he sits on the advisory board for the national counterterrorism center and for the director of national intelligence and he serves on the aspen institute's homeland security group what is a German please welcome Philip Mudd to the national are. boy you miss the most important part of that which is I live part time in Memphis Tennessee the bluff city well thank you. stick with pains barbecue I was running there and a place called midtown Memphis which is a distort part of Memphis years it's my must be now three four years ago wondering whether to write another book cover a couple. and reflecting on some of what I witnessed that the CI particularly during that excruciating time after nine eleven and realizing some of my colleagues many of whom are friends had written their stories but many of the people that I worked with would never speak would never right and their stories would never be told if no one to talk to them. put their stories together on one simple narrative and explain what happened. so I decided that morning running my five miles in midtown Memphis I would do that. this is mostly their story it's not a history. it's not every document that ever appeared related to what we call the program secret detention and interrogation of all kind of prisoners it's the story of men and women that I served with and who decided to speak to me because they trusted me. step back in time with me this is this is we're going into a time machine if you go back to the nineteen nineties. a lot of my colleagues talk about the peace dividend. the time and to paraphrase one of them when we we thought we had. killed the dragon the Soviet Union and only snakes were left. that's a time after the fall of the Soviet Union the fall of the wall where people thought the intelligence challenges of the future may not reach the magnitude that they reach during that time the Soviet Union but the characters of people. knew they had a problem. that problem started mostly when bin laden was in Sudan xcelerated when he moved Afghanistan. but when I spoke to them and I spoke to thirty five or forty again most of whom will never speak when I spoke to them about those times about the peace dividend there's a great sense of frustration in some ways sadness. that they witnessed the rise of a global network. and that the tools they had were so limited when you look back in retrospect realize it's only twenty years ago that's less than a full generation. the tools the CIA had were limited. if you think about loss of budget and personnel I'm not accusing the national security infrastructure of doing anything wrong all of us thought the same thing the dragon is gone if you but if you think about any organization whether it's a tech organization or manufacturing or organization if you lose substantial. pieces of money of people your ability operate declines. there was also the attitude about terrorism think back again only twenty years. nobody I spoke with could have imagine a world when somebody said we could call the conduct lightning raids in Afghanistan. day after day after day the thought that a raid would happen where there is high risk of American soldiers lives was almost unthinkable before nine eleven forget about a U. S. invasion just a raid against an al Qaeda compound and we knew they knew were some of the compounds were. much less much less an armed drone that could kill a terrorist overseas. in debate for years never happened. meanwhile there's atrophy a bit of that atrophy of the sea I for example training training spies decline the number of spice and see I training programs declined. and the attitude about terrorism was mixed remember after nineteen forty seven the targets to see I typically chase were big targets. the Soviets the Chinese the Cuban Missile Crisis big targets. I served I I returned from taking a leave of absence to the CI nineteen ninety two and was told to go to the counter terror center because it was seen as a place where you send people who maybe. weren't ready for primetime which of course was a model I think. that changed over time like any organization even large organizations people make a difference in the personalities the call for personalities that I read about in the book and I knew so well for critical in keeping counterterrorism from declining further in the nineties. George tenet. the CIA director was immersed in counterterrorism and insisted that counterterrorism get some level of privacy insisted on budget any insisted on ensuring that there was leadership there that was well regarded across the agency not common in the nineteen nineties including. the director of the center again and call for black legendary in my business who raise the profile of counterterrorism increasing the quality of people who were going over there increasing the respective characters and its C. I. before nine eleven but make no mistake. the peace dividend for intelligence the lack of focus on terrorism. that on that day on that day. the CIA and the counter terrorist world was not only not prepared they could not be prepared. they all talk to me about feeling before but especially in the searing months and years after nine eleven about feeling like they are on the back foot. on that day and I had this is this is not over dramatized everything changed. years of debate about armed drones done years of debate about rates in Afghanistan Afghanistan forget about rates to see I will be first in with operatives with money. technology guidance within weeks of nine eleven forget about rates the U. S. army big green will invade Afghanistan. the transition not only in resources but in attitude was foundational. the CIA director used to ask us I sat in on the nightly threat briefings for years I was in we had about five or six briefers I was trading back and forth with another one of my colleagues opening the meeting with the threat briefing a matrix of ten or fifteen or twenty threats people who would write and threats to a website for security services who would tell us that they uncovered a threat. intercepted communications were all kind of was talking about coming to the United States. I started those briefings in one of the things that was so evident and that was spoken around some of those tables with a simple concept. we anticipated a second wave what we call the second wave for years the second wave was what we anticipated would be another nine eleven but perhaps worse because al Qaeda had an anthrax program that we did not fully understand. for months for months and longer we did not understand the research and development we did not understand whether they have taken strains of anthrax out of Afghanistan there was concern that the second wave might not be aircraft that it might be anthrax and added to that was a fundamental problem. we did not understand the adversary. the human source penetration of the bread and butter of a human source of a human informant organization like see IT human source penetration and this is operative speaking to me this is not me speaking the people who ran operations against al Qaeda would tell you the human source penetration was modest. so in the midst of America watching horrific videos of people jumping off buildings and watching pages in the newspapers of faces of the fallen we were sitting behind the scenes with the director saying if there is that second wave tomorrow. can you say I wish I had done this that or the other thing. why don't you do it today. Philip Mudd blacks the CIA in a post nine eleven world. in the midst of all this there was a drumbeat in the spring of two thousand two and I witnessed a lot of this first hand. there was intense and getting louder. in that drum beat was the hunt. for the first major. the I. captive Abu Zubeida. one of the challenges out al Qaeda had was they miscalculated what the US response to nine eleven would be they did not anticipate a such a huge response they thought it might be they didn't anticipate they would take the towers down but they thought the response might be more cruise missiles they also anticipated at the U. S. military when and they working with the Taliban would believe the U. S. military justice they had let the Soviets they did not have an exit plan. the military operations intelligence operations the cooperation with the Afghans the US was working with an organ an element of Afghanistan a group called the northern alliance were so successful that al Qaeda had to flee before they ever developed a plan and many of them fled east. into Pakistan where they started making mistakes mistakes that allowed us. in a part of the business intelligence that we call targeting that is having individual analysts responsible for an individual terrorists to the tactical level where you know with that terrorists communications patterns are you know what his family is you know with the the career network as we had individual analyst and a growing intelligence profession call targeting analysts who were watching out beta in the brief things the growing drumbeat what's the sense that the.

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