Israel, Golan Heights, Gaza discussed on The Tel Aviv Review


Grievances of government. That's not responsive corrupt, not serving them. Why do we not see that kind of eruption among Palestinians? It's an interesting point I mean we saw. We've seen seeds of rebellion also in two thousand eleven. As in other Arab countries, but of course, the situation in Palestine is completely different. There is no central place that Palestinians congregate. They are all in des Cantons in the West Bank in Gaza in Jerusalem, no way to unite, there is no way to focus on the Palestinian Authority. As long as people perceive the occupation as the bigger problem, so it's it's difficult to rebel against your own people or your own leadership. If you think that actually the main problem is the occupation, and not not the leadership, and the leadership is a secondary problem, it's an instrument of the occupation and not the patient itself so. Those are two reasons I think are more, but the situation is different in other countries right well. If that sounds complicated, I think your analysis of Hamas is even more complicated because you explain a new documentary, even though Hamas. Considered to be the sworn enemy of Israel, you point out a number of areas of indirect cooperation and I think you even assert that that serves Israel in a way doesn't Israel wanted to destroy Hamas or does it? Not What are the? What is this indirect cooperation that you have observed? I don't that Israel wants to destroy him. I think Mussos the purpose for Israel, and it is exactly the situation bear Israel and Hamas don't recognize each other as legitimate governments or as having the governments. But the state still deal with each other. I mean Israel still accuses the defacto government in Gaza to do this and that, and they hold them accountable for observing certain red lines, and the other way round, and as you know currently negotiations going on more or less direct talks between Israel and about prisoner releases, so there is a defector recognition of authority between the two. And I think Hamas. It's even more startling in the sense that you have this strong on rhetoric of Resistance and Liberation on one hand, but then you have an authoritative very well that the population in Gaza does not want another war does not want to see more bombs, so they work on ceasefire arrangements with Israel. They work on preventing radical routes from launching rockets. They do patrol the board offense so as to prevent infiltration into Israel. They suppress on Salafi. Jihadi groups in in the Gaza Strip and in that sense. They render a security service to Israel. Now. They don't do this because they. They are a friend of Israel, but in their own interest. And the interest that is once again that maintaining power over the tiny strip of land is more important to them than fighting and trying to liberate that land, so they cooperate in directly with Israel. Okay now we have to touch the toxic third rail of the conflict at this moment because I think we haven't really discussed it on our show at all. Which is the trump plan? You've been thinking about the trump plan for much longer than the trump plan has actually existed. You wrote a report about it. Last April the plan was only published. This January and you had anticipated quite a bit of it What are the things that you thought that you that? Stand out for you about this plan that you believe are reflective of the American. Administration or the Israeli administration, certainly somebody's interests. What does this plan do? Whose interest does it advance? I think there is two major issues that stand out with the document. One is the the framing the wording. This is a narrative of the Israeli right. There is no place whatsoever for the Palestinian narrative for the Palestinian interests for Palestinian rights or emissions, and if anybody wants to pursue conflict resolution in any place, this is definitely not a document that could be basis for conflict resolution, only even looking at the wording of the document. And the second one is to content and content I. Think turns the idea of a two state solution upside down in everything it basically. Takes up all the elements that were discussed in earlier visions for Tuesday touch amount. And it turns them on the head that goes with regards to Palestinian sovereignty debate. That sovereignty is limited in that document means that if that were implemented, definitely, there wouldn't be any meaningful. Palestinian state rod what we would see is. Of Occupation Open ended occupation plus annexation of some thirty percent of the West Bank. than the document violates basic principles of international law, and of course, first and foremost, the principle of inadmissibility off the acquisition of territory by force, otherwise known as annexation. Right well. We have some disputes over terminology here because you know many many of the Israeli leaders, including the prime minister, and most of his ministers are talking about extending sovereignty, and they don't use the word annexation so I'm just. Putting that out there as part of the debate here in Israel but what you're talking about acquiring territory by force is annexation. Do you think there's any difference between those two terms of reference? I'm not sure if there is a legal difference between the two. It seems to me when we had this discussion last year. When a the trump administration recognized annexation of the Golan, Heights they even further than Israel had gone before right because Israel also said they hadn't next Golan Heights. They head just extended sovereignty over the Golan Heights I think the the letter of the law is extended Israeli law and jurisdiction so Israel's very cautious about that because they don't even say extent sovereignty, the the Golan Heights law from nineteen eighty says lawn jurisdiction book. Facto annexation because Israel governs there, and it used to be Syria. Absolutely and the. The signal is very clear. The signal is this is not open to negotiation. This is not open for anybody else to govern here. Leaving govern that. which in Brecca doesn't mean that in the future? Somehow you could negotiate about it right because even after annexation of the Golan Heights, the renovations with Syria over it. But I would say not really in good faith, right? Wing that a site this is about annexation. Yes, but that's that raises an interesting point. I mean the trump plan. Okay, you think it's problematic in many ways, certainly for the two state solution. Is it reversible? If any of it is implemented and you know the government is currently discussing beginning legislation on July first just coming right up. If Israel moves ahead with that in some sense. Could these processes be reversible in a future peace process? In theory s on in practice I. Don't see it because. Every step. You take to entrench. Control over territory transferring population into the territory building your infrastructure in a way that it links up to your territory in doesn't integrate into the territory. You're talking about you. Increase the cost full making for taking the back. And I would say that has been the whole approach to the settlement building issue all along since nineteen sixty seven that step by step. You have increased the cost for taking it back. You don't create facts on the ground to take them back afterwards. You create on the ground to entrench your presence. So in theory, yes, everything can be taken back later, but it's not GonNa Happen, and the costs bill be enormous for any Israeli government to fall back behind what is promised in the trump plan, and it would also be normal any American administration to fall back behind what has been trump promised into trump plan. You're saying even if there is a democratic victory in the US, they want to change the policy. That trump is laid down..

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