United States, President Trump, Russia discussed on Overnight re-air of day's programming


They would be the third country to have an air sea land component of nuclear deliverable vehicles. Prison. She is also called for a first year, military force, and we see not just in the nuclear realm, but across the board very sort of Chinese modernization with intermediate range missiles, with hyper Sonics building aircraft carriers and capabilities. Artificial intelligence and so on and so forth. So this combined with context of their behavior in the Indo Pacific region in particular very sort of efforts in the South China, seas is very troubling. And it's something that we are Pentagon, deeply concerned with having touched briefly on Russian and Chinese modernization efforts, let me say, if he were about US modernization efforts since this came up in the past hour. They would be a mistake to say to that. Russian efforts Chinese efforts, or simply somehow in response to our efforts if that were the case, and how would how is it that the Russian modernizations by? Or roughly more than eighty percent complete by Amir Putin's estimate. In those senior defense officials whereas we're in the early stages of modernizing, frankly, our legacy, triad systems that go back quite some time. In fact, our high class fleet of nuclear submarines the first one was launched in nineteen eighty one. And it is scheduled to be replaced in no twenty thirty one beginning with the deployment of the, the next class submarines the Columbia class. We also have our minimum and three land-based portion of our triad. That is a system that was first deployed in one thousand nine hundred seventy. And we expect to feel the next class of Landis ICBM's beginning in twenty twenty nine. And then Thirdly, we have development the twenty Twenty-one raider long range, nuclear capable bomber, which is expected to first. Supplant, eventually replace or aging, b fifty two's, and also the need to a intercontinental bombers. So these systems are enjoyed a great deal of bipartisan support, and we feel, they are essential to keep our new return safe, and, and modern, and affective and really because of the, the lifespan of the existing systems. The choice, here's is not between keeping systems or replacing them between replacing them or losing them all together because as they age out, they become unsafe, and as they become unsafe that undermines deterrence. A couple of other points of contrast is we're, we're not building new nuclear weapons. And that, that differs from Russia and China and as mentioned earlier or non strategic nuclear warheads, or very small in number. Compared with a significant Russian Russian arsenal. In other point of contrast concerns transparence, we have been very transparent about our force posture and our nuclear numbers. And the same cannot be said, certainly, the Chinese nuclear arsenal we had estimates about what we think theory, they have, but there's a certain capacity there, which is certainly troubling. So looking forward or modernization efforts, I mentioned are absolutely essential nuclear arsenal is the backstop of our military operations around the globe, inform. See insurance policy for everything we do, and these modernization efforts cannot be should not be considered some sort of sacrificial, pawn for Perot arms control. But what they do is they provide a strong nuclear deterrence, and they also empower our diplomats with a strong hand as a pursue opportunities of multilateral arms controls where there with our competitors arms control is can help manage strategic competition can help with predictability and can also help reduce the chances miscalculation, the principles that we adhere to her outlined in our nuclear posture, review NPR came out in two thousand eighteen and we. Assu nuclear arms control. That is verifiable is enforceable will contribute to the security United States is allies and partners in also requires willing partners to be effective, and given given the dynamics and the fact of China's trajectory. It is altogether fitting legitimate, to seek to include them, and bring them to the table with Russia is the, the president has articulated, so with that. I'll turn to my same department colleague and turn it over to, to town. James Anderson assistant Defense Secretary at the Hudson institute yesterday. Tom Donahue was a deputy assistant secretary of state for defence policy emerging threats and outreach. Thanks, james. Thanks to the Hudson institute for having. Having us here today. I agree with chains. These think tank forms. Extremely valuable also very valuable policymakers to receive feedback and have robust discussions, just like to build a little bit on what Tim it outlined. And that's the administration's approach to arms control. Several key points where teams I just wanna lay out here perhaps we can have discussion around and going forward. It's imperative to understand that effective verification compliance and enforcement, vital components to successful arms control. I think, as I mentioned control as a means to an end on end unto itself that end being the national security United States. A couple key points at want to build on timid mentioned, number one is. Withdrawal from the INF. And are. August second. We anticipate United States is now said withdraw from the treaty unless Russia comes back into compliance. What I think is important about that episode and really is at the core of the arms, control philosophy of the administration that, even though we've shown our willingness to withdraw from the treaty, one of the things that's very important that we want to talk about today and going forward is, we have not withdrawn from the process of arms control. The president's made that very clear my boss bosses secretary pump has made that very clear and we look forward to engaging both Russia and China robustly with open minds. But also with open, I'd be very clear eyed about. We're at and what we want to accomplish going forward. The president has a certain of arms control to be effective effectively contribute to national security all parties must faithfully implement obligations that gets to the trust piece James mentioned, you must have willing partners across from the table. We intend on engaging. Both Russia and China in good faith or confident that we can achieve an outcome that advances the national security of the United States. Talk a little bit about the State Department's role here. Just a little bit about what our bureau does. People readily and talk about, and I'm sure everybody in this room about Reagan's trust by verify comments in one thousand nine hundred seventy Vic. But it was actually in one thousand nine hundred eighty two sixty five where he outlined four key, tenets of arms control. Regime that I think are as important today as that were in one thousand nine hundred to just run through them real quick. And we want compliance with the provisions of existing and future arms control agreements is essential to their success, and therefore to national security that effective. Verification is necessary to ensure compliance with those agreements. Verification serves to detect and deter possible violations of an agreement and provide timely warning threats to our national security. Verification is necessary to assure the confidence of the congress and the public large that's Pacific arms control measures compatible without security, and for arms control. The government is to be organized prepared and prepared to deal with all aspects of arms control monitoring verification and compliance issues in a systematic orderly and timely fashion that was from November nineteen eighty-two actually brought it with me. I fall carry these things around, and I think every one of those points, the last one, what does it the national Security Council organized, the government, based on our leadership, based on the president's guidance based on my secretaries guidance to engage robustly to achieve an arms control outcome that is in the interest of the American people. As we all know, three seven years later lot has changed, James and John Ashley pointed out. Competitors aggressively. Modernizing. What we do at the State Department has to evolve as well. Verification capabilities must evolve. This is some of the work that, that we do at the State Department with partners at Detroit, and the department of energy and national labs. And some other partners that we have to sort of quietly Nevada professionally continued to develop verification, mechanisms at a critical, as I outlined that really underpin arms control agreement, and as technology has changed. We continue to invest in look at the next. Family of advocation technologies and we do it quietly, and but it's absolutely critical to the work. For policymakers and go. She needs to know death what we can't verify. So I think that's important against one of those key historical underpinnings for arms control, and where we're going going forward. With that. I think I'll stop and. Turn it back over Rebecca. Thank you. Eight Thomas Donahue, Getty assistant secretary of state at the Hudson institute yesterday. A moderator is Rebecca Hinrichs of Hudson, much for those, Gary, an official remarks that the first question I have is just on my mind as, as we approached the possibility of either extending the new start treaty or perhaps negotiating another treaty. The question that I continue to have that many other tablets. Clearly today, we've heard that there are some other things that the Russians are doing are just outside of new start their air tactical or theater nuclear weapons, and, and some of the other things that they're doing that perhaps aren't in a spirit of the tree that are still in compliance with the treaty does the new start treaty. No insufficient. Provide us greater transparency. It's useful for trust building verification to at least the strategic element of the, of the Russians nuclear program, or does it hamstring United States disproportionately in a way that perhaps it would be fruitful to negotiate a different treaty. I'll turn that over to Tim. I if anybody else would like to comment on that. She's been radio programming from Thursday. So I think from our perspective, the new start treaty is a discussion decision. The president will make some point next year. I think from his perspective. Given everything we heard from general Ashley, what we need to focus on is the comprehensive nuclear threat, and general, Ashley spend a lot of time talking in some detail some for the first time on the full scope of the Russian and Chinese programs. And so, for example, I think general is we talked a little bit about the up to two thousand non-strategic nuclear weapons, the Russians have. Well, we don't have any, we don't have as much insight into those capabilities as we would like precisely because Russia, Russia has refused to talk about those things in the context of arms control. So we have limited verification, we have limited inspections. And so there's, there's a significant question with respect to whether or not the Russians are interested in extending new start. They have these contrivances that they have hurled against us, and the prior administration on how we've converted our was missile submarines are heavy bombers. And so we've got to establish whether or not the Russians are interested in extending the treaty. But I think the higher priorities to look at the totality of the Russian and the Chinese. These programs because we have so much time left on the clock. For new start in figure out. Can we get to an arms control agreement that covers more of the systems that threaten the threaten the United States and not just the systems that Russia that Russia, for example, wants to talk about and acknowledging that China would just as soon not be in this discussion?.

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