China, Gordon Chang, Scott Herald discussed on John Batchelor


I'm John Batchelor. This is the John Batchelor show. Good evening. Gordon Chang, the daily basis here, and we're going to turn to expose an incident. An incident near Japan in these last days, March twenty third where the Japan defense ministry. Scrambled fighter jets to intercept PRC red China, why nine patrol aircraft. What is the significance of this? Why were those why nine patrol aircraft near the noth- to the Japanese to scramble to scramble fighters. I performance warplanes. There are photographs of this incident. You have to say that the Chinese wanted to be seeing the Chinese aircraft have serial numbers. So they can all be linked to the P L A EC fleet. What does this tell you about the contest that China is conducting against its neighborhood? We welcome someone to help us experts say this. This is our friend Scott herald was an associate director of the center for Asia. A center for Asia policy at the RAND Corporation, Scott is here to explicatives. And then we're going to go on to a story about something called the office of net assessment. Scott, a very good evening to you. Gordon? You wanna take over this question, Scott, we see these Chinese anti-submarine warfare planes, very close to the Japanese islands. So the question is what's going on here? Why are the Chinese doing this? And obviously, they're AS w capabilities are increasing. Why is this a threat to Japan and the United States? That's a great question, Gordon, and John good to hear from you. I I think there's three points to make here one. As you noted Gordon, China has traditionally been regarded as quite weak in the antisubmarine warfare realm, and as appeal as reforms and press and changing things requirements prepare to fight win wars can. Continued on sold. It looks like the P L A is beginning to move to try to make some steps to redress its weakness in the undersea warfare domain. Second as as we've talked about in the past. There is an undersea warfare of race. If you will in the Asia Pacific, that's a foot China has built up its submarine fleet. Japan has decided to retire some currently existing boats, even as they induct new bolt into the fleet. I want itself is building up. What will ultimately be eight boats in the late twenty twenty s Vietnam has procured kilo class submarines from Russia and Indonesia is building up its submarine fleet with helps from South Korea. So there's a lot of action narrative, of course, the United States navy is no slouch in the undersea worker domain the best in the world. And then finally it's worth pointing out China's air intrusions into Japan over the last several years have been extremely numerous and have been designed to impose costs on Japan, forcing Japan to scramble to identify foreign airframe. That are entering into Japanese air defense identification zone areas. So I think there is a kind of an over determination here at serves China's interest in a number of ways to try to build up its capabilities to track submarines, and then also to impose some additional challenges on your pass, forcing them to scramble yet again taking resources away from training and exercises this this conduct. Then was deliberate. They wanted themselves photograph they wanted the scramble and what did they win for? What what is the gain that the navy has for Scott? I think the the takeaway from this job is that the were here. Our capabilities are growing you'd have to get used to the fact that we are going to be able to increasingly tracking potentially prosecute targets. Whether those are Japanese submarines or whether they're preparing capability for the eventual induction of Taiwan's submarine fleet or to potentially track. The US navy all of our efforts have got to be stepped up if we want to continue to maintain dominance. And that's space reminds me of the Cold War of incidents between the US navy and the Russian navy is that how I should interpret this. Let's let's say this. You know, ultimately, there is nothing that prevent the if I understand correctly where this incident occurred, it was not in Japanese territorial airspace. And so in that sense. You know, yes, we're seeing the moves of one great power competitor to try to. Track the capabilities of its rivals. But there's nothing, you know, this is one of the challenges with China it often plays in areas where nothing it's doing illegal. And yet there is a very clear strategic message being sat right Gordon office of net assessment. What is that? And what is your question? Yes, scott. You're a senior director at rand. This week. It was a sad event that Andy Marshall also of ram passed away. He started the office of net assessment in the Pentagon. He was around for December seventh Scott if you can just mentioned to the audience who Andy Marshall was and why is so important to America's development of China policy and the defense department. Yeah. Sure, Gordon, it's an honor to be able to talk about Mr. Marshall. Certainly a towering figure in the strategic community. I did not have the privilege of getting to know him personally. Although many of the leading luminaries today who write in and think in Washington about the challenges of countering either China or Russia kind of got their start working with him and have gone on to head up some of the most prestigious other think tanks in DC the center for strategic and budgetary assessments being the first and foremost among those who have had a close linkage to the of that assessment, Mr. Marshall from I believe the late nineteen seventies onwards headed this internal think tank at the Pentagon called the officer. He helped to pioneer the assessment methodology of trying to track and adversaries overall strategy concept of operations ways of building and maintaining economic and military power and trying to assess long term trends often far much further out into the future than the kind of day to day or even year. Year challenges that that warfighters in the Pentagon are generally focused on so at the time of the early to mid nineties when China by comparison to today, extremely weak when many in the US strategic community were thinking, well, maybe China will change maybe China can be engaged and encouraged to cooperate and adopt the norms of Liberal International order, Mr. Marshall was already encouraging his analysts, including through the disbursement of funds to think tanks to do targeted research on Chinese strategic thinking capabilities to look at China as a potential peer competitor trying. That's what that world would look by try to encourage the United States. I think what capabilities would you need to build? What approaches would you need to have to allies that are that would ensure that the United States was not confronting this challenge, alone and disarmed back to the incident. With the scrambling of the Japanese warplanes, my understanding some years past is that the weakness of the a navy is anti submarine warfare. What is called by the professionals AS w is that still the case Scott? Yes. So there's there's a number of elements to antisubmarine warfare, John. Some of those have to do with having a highly competent, submarine crews, and and extremely advanced submarine themselves. So submarines are a big part of any anti-submarine warfare capability. So too are having a large number of destroyers that can watch helicopters with dipping sonars and Santa beliefs to drop, and then also fixed wing airframes like the one we saw and we're discussing earlier tonight. Those capabilities when combined can prove to be extremely risky for an adversary submarine that might be detected and to date because China's submarines have been relatively noisy because China's. Rotary-wing shipborne rotary-wing capabilities have been fairly weak, and because China has not until recent years had a large presence in the airspaces outside of its envelope of surface to air missile batteries. China has been relatively weakened AS w I think it's quite clear now that they are looking to address that. And in fact, if he were alive today, I'm sure Mr. Marshall would be saying something akin to, you know, this is this is where we thought they might be if they didn't reform and they didn't. And here's where we need to go next, which is to kind of look at what appeal a with advanced AS w capabilities would mean for the US and its allies in the Indo Pacific, Scott, Harold, a senior director of the center for Asia policy pup Pacific policy at the RAND Corporation the incident took place March twenty third that would be chapter one of a thriller. Gordon Chang of.

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